ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ON
S. 7
A BILL TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY PRESCRIBING FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

NOVEMBER 19 (legislative day, October 29), 1945.—Ordered to be printed
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Mr. McCarran, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 7]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (S. 7), to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon, with an amendment, and recommend that the bill do pass, as amended.

There is a widespread demand for legislation to settle and regulate the field of Federal administrative law and procedure. The subject is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, and there is no recognizable body of such law, as there is for the courts in the Judicial Code. There are no clearly recognized legal guides for either the public or the administrators. Even the ordinary operations of administrative agencies are often difficult to know. The Committee on the Judiciary is convinced that, at least in essentials, there should be some simple and standard plan of administrative procedure.

I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

For more than 10 years Congress has considered proposals for general statutes respecting administrative law and procedure. Figure 1 on page 2 presents a convenient chronological chart of the main bills introduced. Each of them has received widespread notice and intense consideration.

The growth of the Government, particularly of the executive branch, has added to the problem. The situation had become such by the middle of the 1930's that the President appointed a committee
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to make a comprehensive survey of and suggestions concerning administrative methods, overlapping functions, and diverse organization. While that committee was not primarily concerned with the more detailed questions of administrative law and procedure as the term is now understood, it was inevitably brought face to face with the fundamental problem of the inconsistent union of prosecuting and deciding functions exercised by many executive agencies.

**Report of President's Committee.**—In 1937 the President's Committee on Administrative Management issued its report, in which it said (pp. 32-33, 39-40):

The executive branch of the Government of the United States has grown up without plan or design. To look at it now, no one would ever recognize the structure which the founding fathers erected a century and a half ago. Commissions have been the result of legislative groping rather than the pursuit of a consistent policy. They are in reality miniature independent governments set up to deal with the railroad problem, the banking problem, or the radio problem. They constitute a headless "fourth branch" of the Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers. There is a conflict of principle involved in their make-up and functions. They are vested with duties of administration and at the same time they are given important judicial work. The evils resulting from this confusion of principles are insidious and far reaching. Pressures and influences properly enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating and administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate private rights. But the mixed duties of the commissions render escape from these subversive influences impossible. Furthermore, the same men are obliged to serve both as prosecutors and as judges. This not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness. Commission decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the Commission, in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself.

To which, in transmitting it to Congress, the President added (pp. iii-v):

I have examined this report carefully and thoughtfully, and am convinced that it is a great document of permanent importance. The practice of creating independent regulatory commissions, who perform administrative work in addition to judicial work, threatens to develop a "fourth branch" of the Government for which there is no sanction in the Constitution.

See also pages 41-42, 207-210, 215-219, 222-223, 230-239 for additional comments and the very drastic remedy proposed in that report. That Committee recommended the complete separation of investigative-prosecuting functions and personnel from deciding functions and personnel.

**Earlier Hearings and Bills.**—In 1938 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on a proposal for the creation of an administrative court and, in that connection, issued a committee print elaborately analyzing administrative powers conferred by statute (S. 3676, 75th Cong., 3d sess.). In 1939 the Walter-Logan administrative procedure bill was favorably reported to the Senate (S. Rept. 442, 76th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 915). In the third session of the same Congress the Walter-Logan bill (S. 915 and H. R. 6324) was reported to the House of Representatives with amendments (see H. Rept. 1149, 76th Cong., 1st sess.; for an annotated draft, see S. Doc. 145, 76th Cong., 3d sess.). The Walter-Logan bill was passed by the Congress but vetoed by the President in 1940 in part on the ground
that action should await the then imminent final report by a committee appointed in the executive branch to study the entire situation (H. Doc. 986, 76th Cong., 3d sess.).

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE.—In December 1938 the Attorney General, renewing the suggestion which he had previously made respecting the need for procedural reform in the wide and growing field of administrative law, recommended the appointment of a commission to make a thorough survey of existing practices and procedure and point the way to improvements (S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 251). The President concurred and authorized the Attorney General to appoint a committee for that purpose (id., p. 252). This Committee was composed of Government officials, teachers, judges, and private practitioners. It made an interim report in January 1940 (id., 254–258). Its staff prepared, and in 1940–41 issued, a series of studies of the procedures of the principal administrative agencies and bureaus in the Federal Government (S. Doc. 186, 76th Cong., 3d sess., pts. 1–13; and S. Doc. 10, 77th Cong., 1st sess., pts. 1–14). The Committee held executive sessions over a long period, at which the representatives of Federal agencies were heard. It also held public hearings. It then prepared and issued a voluminous final report. See Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies—Report of the Committee on Administrative Procedure, Appointed by the Attorney General, at the Request of the President, to Investigate the Need for Procedural Reform in Various Administrative Tribunals and to Suggest Improvements Therein (S. Doc. 8, 77th Cong., 1st sess.). That Committee is popularly known as the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure and will be so designated in this report. In the framing of the bill herewith reported, (S. 7), your committee has had the benefit of the factual studies and analyses prepared by the Attorney General’s Committee.

SUBSEQUENT BILLS AND HEARINGS.—Growing out of the work of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, several bills were introduced in 1941 (S. 674, 675, and 918, 77th Cong., 1st sess.). Hearings were held on these bills during April, May, June, and July of that year. (See Administrative Procedure, hearings, 77th Cong., 1st sess., pts. 1–3, plus appendix.) However, the then emergent international situation prompted a postponement of further consideration of the matter. But all interested administrative agencies were heard at length at that time and the proposals then pending involved the same basic issues as the present bill.

PRESENT BILL.—Based upon the studies and hearings in connection with prior bills on the subject, and after several years of consultation with interested parties in and out of official positions, S. 2030 (78th Cong., 2d sess.) was introduced on June 21, 1944, the companion bill in the House of Representatives being H. R. 5081. The introduction of these bills brought forth a volume of further suggestions from every quarter. As a result, with the opening of the present Congress, a revised and simplified bill was introduced (S. 7, January 6, 1945; H. R. 1203, January 8, 1945).

CONSIDERATION AND REVISION.—Much informal discussion followed the introduction of S. 7 and H. R. 1203. The House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary held hearings in the latter part of June 1945.
Previously, that committee and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had requested administrative agencies to submit their views in writing. These were carefully analyzed and, with the aid of representatives of the Attorney General and interested private organizations, in May 1945 there was issued a Senate committee print setting forth in parallel columns the bill as introduced and a tentatively revised text.

Again interested parties in and out of Government submitted comments orally or in writing on the revised text. These were analyzed by the committee’s staff and a further committee print was issued in June 1945. In four parallel columns it set forth (1) the text of the bill as introduced, (2) the text of the tentatively revised bill previously published, (3) a general explanation of provisions with references to the report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure and other authorities, and (4) a summary of views and suggestions received.

Thereafter the Attorney General again designated representatives to hold further discussions with interested agencies and to screen and correlate further agency views, some of which were submitted in writing and some orally. Private parties and representatives of private organizations also participated.

Following these discussions the committee drafted the bill as reported, which is set forth in full in appendix A. The Attorney General’s favorable report on the bill, as revised, is set forth in appendix B.

II. APPROACH OF THE COMMITTEE

In undertaking the foregoing very lengthy process of consideration, the committee has attempted to make sure that no operation of the Government is unduly restricted. The committee has also taken the position that the bill must reasonably protect private parties even at the risk of some incidental or possible inconvenience to or change in present administrative operations. The committee is convinced, however, that no administrative function is improperly affected by the present bill.

The principal problems.—The principal problems of the committee have been: First, to distinguish between different types of administrative operations. Second, to frame general requirements applicable to each such type of operation. Third, to set forth those requirements in clear and simple terms. Fourth, to make sure that the bill is complete enough to cover the whole field.

The committee feels that it has avoided the mistake of attempting to oversimplify the measure. It has therefore not hesitated to state functional classifications and exceptions where those could be rested upon firm grounds. In so doing, it has been the undeviating policy to deal with types of functions as such and in no case with administrative agencies by name. Thus certain war and defense functions are exempted, but not the War or Navy Departments in the performance of their other functions. Manifestly, it would be folly to assume to distinguish between “good” agencies and others, and no such distinction is made in the bill. The legitimate needs of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, have been fully considered but it has not been placed in a favored position by exemption from the bill.
The committee feels that administrative operations should be treated as a whole lest the neglect of some link defeat the purposes of the bill. The chart set forth as figure 2 on page 9 emphasizes this approach of the committee.

Comparison with Walter-Logan Bill.—The Walter-Logan bill, which was vetoed by the President, differed materially from S. 7 as reported. While it distinguished between regulations and adjudications, the Walter-Logan bill simply required administrative hearings for each and provided special methods of judicial review.

More particularly, in the matter of general regulations, the Walter-Logan bill failed to distinguish between the different classes of rules. It stated that rules should be issued within 1 year after the enactment of the statutory authority. It required a mandatory administrative review upon notice and hearing within a year (sec. 2), and set up a system of judicial review through declaratory judgments by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia within a limited time after the adoption of any rule (H. R. 6324, 76th Cong., 3d sess., sec. 3).

In the adjudication of particular cases, the Walter-Logan bill also provided for administrative hearings of any "controversy" before a board of any three employees of any agency. Decisions of such boards were to be made within 30 days and were subject to the apparently summary approval or modification of the head of the agency or his deputy. But independent commissions (not less than three members sitting) were required to hold a further hearing after any hearing by an examiner (sec. 4). A special form of judicial review was provided for any administrative adjudication (sec. 5). A long list of exemptions of agencies by name concluded that bill (sec. 7).

The present bill must be distinguished from the Walter-Logan bill in several essential respects. It differentiates the several types of rules. It requires no agency hearings in connection with either regulations or adjudications unless statutes already do so in particular cases, thereby preserving rights of judicial trials de novo. Where statutory hearings are otherwise provided, it fills in some of the essential requirements; and it provides for a special class of semi-independent subordinate hearing officers. It includes several types of incidental procedures. It confers numerous procedural rights. It limits administrative penalties. It contains more comprehensive provisions for judicial review for the redress of any legal wrong. And, since it is drawn entirely upon a functional basis, it contains no exemptions of agencies as such.

Comparison with Attorney General's Committee Report.—The present bill is more complete than the solution favored by the majority of the Attorney General's Committee, but less prolix and more definite than the minority proposed. While it follows generally the views of good administrative practice as expressed by the whole of that Committee, it differs in several important respects. It provides that agencies may choose whether their examiners shall make the initial decision or merely recommend a decision, whereas the Attorney General's Committee made a decision by examiners mandatory. It provides some general limitations upon administrative powers and sanctions, particularly in the rigorous field of licensing, while the Attorney General's Committee did not touch upon the sub-
ject. It relies upon independence, salary security, and tenure during good behavior of examiners within the framework of the civil service, whereas the Attorney General's Committee favored short-term appointments approved by a special "Office of Administrative Procedure."

A more detailed comparison of the present bill, with full references to the report of the Attorney General's Committee, is to be found in the third parallel column of the print issued by this committee in June 1945.

III. STRUCTURE OF THE BILL

The bill, as reported, is not a specification of the details of administrative procedure, nor is it a codification of administrative law. Instead, out of long consideration and in the light of the studies heretofore mentioned, there has been framed an outline of minimum basic essentials. Figure 2 on page 9 diagrams the bill.

The bill is designed to afford parties affected by administrative powers a means of knowing what their rights are and how they may be protected. By the same token, administrators are provided with a simple course to follow in making administrative determinations. The jurisdiction of the courts is clearly stated. The bill thus provides for public information, administrative operation, and judicial review.

SUBSTANCE OF THE BILL.—What the bill does in substance may be summarized under four headings:

1. It provides that agencies must issue as rules certain specified information as to their organization and procedure, and also make available other materials of administrative law (sec. 3).

2. It states the essentials of the several forms of administrative proceedings (secs. 4, 5, and 6) and the limitations on administrative powers (sec. 9).

3. It provides in more detail the requirements for administrative hearings and decisions in cases in which statutes require such hearings (secs. 7 and 8).

4. It sets forth a simplified statement of judicial review designed to afford a remedy for every legal wrong (sec. 10).

The first of these is basic, because it requires agencies to take the initiative in informing the public. In stating the essentials of the different forms of administrative proceedings, it carefully distinguishes between the so-called legislative functions of administrative agencies (where they issue general regulations) and their judicial functions (in which they determine rights or liabilities in particular cases).

The bill provides quite different procedures for the "legislative" and "judicial" functions of administrative agencies. In the "rule making" (that is, "legislative") function it provides that, with certain exceptions, agencies must publish notice and at least permit interested parties to submit their views in writing for agency consideration before issuing general regulations (sec. 4). No hearings are required by the bill unless statutes already do so in a particular case. Similarly, in "adjudications" (that is, the "judicial" function) no agency hearings are required unless statutes already do so, but in the latter case
the mode of hearing and decision is prescribed (sec. 5). Where existing statutes require that either general regulations (called "rules" in the bill) or particularized adjudications (called "orders" in the bill) be made after agency hearing or opportunity for such hearing, then section 7 spells out the minimum requirements for such hearings, section 8 states how decisions shall be made thereafter, and section 11 provides for examiners to preside at hearings and make or participate in decisions.

While the administrative power and procedure provisions of sections 4 through 9 are law apart from court review, the provisions for judicial review provide parties with a method of enforcing their rights in a proper case (sec. 10). However, it is expressly provided that the judicial review provisions are not operative where statutes otherwise preclude judicial review or where agency action is by law committed to agency discretion.

Kinds of Provisions.—The bill may be said to be composed of five types of provisions:

1. Those which are largely formal such as the sections setting forth the title (sec. 1), definitions (sec. 2), and rules of construction (sec. 12).
2. Those which require agencies to publish or make available, information on administrative law and procedure (sec. 3).
3. Those which provide for different kinds of procedures such as rule making (sec. 4), adjudications (sec. 5), and miscellaneous matters (sec. 6) as well as for limitations upon sanctions and powers (sec. 9).
4. Those which provide more of the detail for hearings (sec. 7) and decisions (sec. 8) as well as for examiners (sec. 11).
5. Those which provide for judicial review (sec. 10).

The bill is so drafted that its several sections and subordinate provisions are closely knit. The substantive provisions of the bill should be read apart from the purely formal provisions and minor functional distinctions. The definitions in section 2 are important, but they do not indicate the scope of the bill since the subsequent provisions make many functional distinctions and exceptions. The public information provisions of section 3 are of the broadest application because, while some functions and some operations may not lend themselves to formal procedure, all administrative operations should as a matter of policy be disclosed to the public except as secrecy may obviously be required or only internal agency "housekeeping" arrangements may be involved. Sections 4 and 5 prescribe the basic requirements for the making of rules and the adjudication of particular cases. In each case, where other statutes require opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 7 and 8 set forth the minimum requirements for such hearings and the agency decisions thereafter while section 11 provides for the appointment and tenure of examiners who may participate. Section 6 prescribes the rights of private parties in a number of miscellaneous respects which may be incidental to rule making, adjudication, or the exercise of any other agency authority. Section 9 limits sanctions, and section 10 provides for judicial review.
Section 1 prescribes the title, section 2 the definitions, and section 3 the effective dates and rules of construction. In the above diagram, the first row of sections sets forth the several kinds of requirements, procedures, and limitations; and the second row includes hearing and decision requirements where other statutes require a hearing. Section 10 on judicial review relates not only to decisions made after agency hearing but, in appropriate cases, to the exercise of any other administrative power or authority.

IV. ANALYSIS OF PROVISIONS

The following statements respecting each provision of the bill are designed to answer specific questions relating to language and objectives. Under each section or subsection heading there appears an italicized synopsis of the provision, followed by one or more paragraphs of analysis or special comment. A reading of all the italicized paragraphs will, therefore, afford a synopsis of the whole bill, which is reproduced at length in appendix A at page 32.

Sec. 1. Title.—It is provided that the measure may be cited as the Administrative Procedure Act.

While a short title has been deemed preferable, it may be noted that the bill actually provides for both administrative procedure and judicial review.

Sec. 2. Definitions.—The definitions apply to the remainder of the bill.
For the purpose of both simplifying the language of later provisions and achieving greater precision, general terms of administrative law and procedure are defined.

(a) **Agency.**—The word "agency" is defined by excluding legislative, judicial, and territorial authorities and by including any other "authority" whether or not within or subject to review by another agency. The bill is not to be construed to repeal delegations of authority provided by law. Explicitly exempted from the term "agency", except for the public information requirements of section 3, are (1) agencies composed of representatives of parties or of organizations of parties and (2) defined war authorities including civilian authorities functioning under temporary or named statutes operative during "present hostilities."

The word "authority" is advisedly used as meaning whatever persons are vested with powers to act (rather than the mere form of agency organization such as department, commission, board, or bureau) because the real authorities may be some subordinate or semidependent person or persons within such form of organization. In conferring administrative powers, statutes customarily do not refer to formal agencies (such as the Department of Agriculture) but to specified persons (such as the Secretary of Agriculture). Boards or commissions usually possess authority which does not extend to individual members or to their subordinates.

The bill does not repeal delegations of authority which are duly authorized by existing law. This does not mean, however, that delegations are effective where other provisions of the bill require otherwise. For example, the requirement that examiners in certain instances hear cases would supersede any existing delegations to prosecuting officers to hear such cases.

Agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by them are exempted because such agencies as presently operated do not lend themselves to the adjudicative procedures set out in the remaining sections of the bill. They tend to be arbitral or mediating agencies rather than tribunals.

The exclusion of war functions and agencies, whether exercised by civil or military personnel, affords all necessary freedom of action for the exercise of such functions in the period of reconversion. It has been deemed wise to exempt such functions in view of the fact that they are rarely required to be exercised upon statutory hearing, with which much of the bill is concerned, and the fact that they are rapidly liquidating. It should be noted, however, that even war functions are not exempted from the public information requirement of section 3. "Present hostilities" means those connected with the war brought on at Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

(b) **Person and Party.**—"Person" is defined to include specified forms of organizations other than agencies. "Party" is defined to include anyone named, or admitted or seeking and entitled to be admitted, as a party in any agency proceeding except that nothing in the subsection is to be construed to prevent an agency from admitting anyone as a party for limited purposes.

The definition of person includes both individuals and any form of organization but advisedly excludes Federal agencies. The practice of agencies to admit persons as parties in proceedings "for limited purposes" is expressly preserved, but that exception does not authorize
any agency to ignore or prejudice the rights of the true or full parties in any proceeding.

(c) Rule and Rule Making.—"Rule" is defined as any agency statement of general applicability designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law, policy, organization, procedure, or practice requirements. "Rule making" means agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule and includes any prescription for the future of rates, wages, financial structures, etc., etc.

The definition of "rule" is important because it prescribes the kind of operation that is subject to section 4 rather than section 5. The specification of the activities that are involved in rule making is included in order to comprehend them beyond any possible question. They are defined as rules to the extent that, whether of general or particular applicability, they formally prescribe a course of conduct for the future rather than merely pronounce existing rights or liabilities. It should be noted that rule making is exempted from some of the general requirements of sections 7 and 8 relating to the details of hearings and decisions.

(d) Order and Adjudication.—"Order" means the final disposition of any matter, other than rule making but including licensing, whether or not affirmative, negative, or declaratory in form. "Adjudication" means the agency process for the formulation of an order.

The term "order" is defined to exclude rules. "Licensing" is specifically included to remove any possible question at the outset. Licenses involve a pronouncement of present rights of named parties although they may also prescribe terms and conditions for future observance. It should be noted, however, that licensing is exempted from some of the provisions of sections 5, 7, and 8 relating to hearings and decisions.

(e) License and Licensing.—"License" is defined to include any form of required official permission such as certificate, charter, etc. "Licensing" is defined to include agency process respecting the grant, renewal, modification, denial, revocation, etc., of a license.

This definition supplements subsection (d). Later provisions of the bill distinguish between initial licenses and renewals or other licensing proceedings. A further distinction might have been drawn between licenses for a term, such as radio licenses, and those of indefinite duration, such as certificates of convenience and necessity.

(f) Sanction and Relief.—"Sanction" is defined to include any agency prohibition, withholding of relief, penalty, seizure, assessment, requirement, restriction, etc. "Relief" is defined to include any agency grant, recognition, or other beneficial action.

These definitions are mainly relevant to section 9 on sanctions and powers and to section 10 on judicial review. The purpose of the subsection is to define exhaustively every possible form of legitimate administrative power or authority.

(g) Agency Proceeding and Action.—"Agency proceeding" is defined to mean any agency process defined in the foregoing subsections (c), (d), or (e). For the purpose of section 10 on judicial review, "agency action" is defined to include an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, and failure to act.

The term "agency proceeding" is specially defined in order to simplify the language of subsequent provisions and to assure that all forms of administrative procedure or authority are included. The
term “agency action” brings together previously defined terms in order to simplify the language of the judicial review provisions of section 10 and to assure the complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action, or inaction.

SEC. 3. Public Information.—From the public information provisions of section 3 there are exempted matters (1) requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) relating solely to the internal management of an agency.

The public information requirements of section 3 are in many ways among the most important, far-reaching, and useful provisions of the bill. For the information and protection of the public wherever located, these provisions require agencies to take the mystery out of administrative procedure by stating it. The section has been drawn upon the theory that administrative operations and procedures are public property which the general public, rather than a few specialists or lobbyists, is entitled to know or to have the ready means of knowing with definiteness and assurance.

The introductory clause states the only general exceptions. The first, which excepts matters requiring secrecy in the public interest, is necessary but is not to be construed to defeat the purpose of the remaining provisions. It would include confidential operations in any agency, such as some of the aspects of the investigating or prosecuting functions of the Secret Service or Federal Bureau of Investigation, but no other functions or operations in those or other agencies. Closely related is the second exception, of matters relating solely to internal agency management, which may not be construed to defeat other provisions of the bill or to permit withholding of information as to operations which remaining provisions of the section or of the whole bill require to be public or publicly available.

(a) Rules.—Every agency is required to publish in the Federal Register its (1) organization, (2) places of doing business with the public, (3) methods of rule making and adjudication including the rules of practice relating thereto, and (4) such substantive rules as it may frame for the guidance of the public. No person is in any manner to be required to resort to organization or procedure not so published.

Since the bill leaves wide latitude for each agency to frame its own procedures, this subsection requiring agencies to state their organization and procedures in the form of rules is essential for the information of the public. The publication must be kept up to date. The enumerated classes of informational rules must also be separately stated so that, for example, rules of procedure will be separate from rules of substance, interpretation, or policy. The effect of any one of the first three classifications of required rule making is that agencies must also publish their internal delegations of authority. The subsection forbids secrecy of rules binding or applicable to the public, or of delegations of authority. The requirement that no one shall “in any manner” be required to resort to unpublished organization or procedure protects the public from being required to pursue remedies that are not generally known.

(b) Opinions and Orders.—Agencies are required to publish or, pursuant to rule, make available to public inspection all final opinions or orders in the adjudication of cases except those held confidential for good cause and not cited as precedents.
Rule making results in published material in the Federal Register as set forth in subsection (a), but in the case of adjudication there is no standard, general, and official medium of publication. Some agencies publish sets of some of their decisions, but otherwise the public is not informed as to how and where they may see decisions or consult precedents. Requiring each agency to formulate and publish a rule respecting access to their final opinions and orders will give the general public notice as to how such information may be secured. While the subsection does not mention "rulings"—which are neither rules nor orders but are general interpretations, such as the opinions of agency counsel—if authoritative, they would be covered by the fourth category in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Public Records.—Except as statutes may require otherwise or information may be held confidential for good cause, matters of official record are to be made available to persons properly and directly concerned in accordance with rules to be issued by the agency.

This provision supplements subsections (a) and (b). The requirement of an agency rule on the availability of official records is inserted for the same purpose as in subsection (b). In many cases, the interest of the person seeking access to the record will be determinative. Agencies should classify data in order to specify what may be disclosed and what may not; and they must in any case provide how and where applications for information may be made, how they will be determined, and who will do so. Refusals of information would be subject to the requirements of section 6 (d).

SEC. 4. Rule Making.—The introductory clause exempts from all of the requirements of section 4 any rule making so far as there are involved (1) military, naval, or foreign affairs functions or (2) matters relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.

These exceptions would not, of course, relieve any agency from requirements imposed by other statutes. The phrase "foreign affairs functions," used here and in some other provisions of the bill, is not to be loosely interpreted to mean any function extending beyond the borders of the United States but only those "affairs" which so affect relations with other governments that, for example, public rule making provisions would clearly provoke definitely undesirable international consequences. The exception of matters of management or personnel would operate only so far as not inconsistent with other provisions of the bill relating to internal management or personnel. The exception of proprietary matters is included because the principal considerations in most such cases relate to mechanics and interpretations or policy, and it is deemed wise to encourage and facilitate the issuance of rules by dispensing with all mandatory procedural requirements. None of these exceptions, however, is to be taken as encouraging agencies not to adopt voluntary public rule making procedures where useful to the agency or beneficial to the public. The exceptions merely confer a complete discretion upon agencies to decide what, if any, public rule making procedures they will adopt in a given situation within their terms. It should be noted, moreover, that the exceptions apply only "to the extent" that the excepted subjects are directly involved.

(a) Notice.—General notice of proposed rule making must be published in the Federal Register and must include (1) time, place, and
nature of proceedings, (2) reference to authority under which held, and
(3) terms, substance, or issues involved. However, except where notice
and hearing is required by some other statute, the subsection does not
apply to rules other than those of substance or where the agency for good
cause finds (and incorporates the finding and reasons therefor in the
published rule) that notice and public procedure are impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.

Agency notice must be sufficient to fairly apprise interested parties
of the issues involved, so that they may present responsive data or
argument relating thereto. The subsection governs the application
of the public procedures required by the next subsection, since those
procedures only apply where notice is required by this subsection.
Agencies are given discretion to dispense with notice (and conse-
quently with public proceedings) in the case of interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, pro-
cedure, or practice. This does not mean, however, that agencies
should not—where useful to them or helpful to the public—undertake
public procedures in connection with such rule making. The exemp-
tion of situations of emergency or necessity is not an “escape clause”
in the sense that any agency has discretion to disregard its terms or
the facts. A true and supported or supportable finding of necessity
or emergency must be made and published. “Impracticable” means
a situation in which the due and required execution of the agency
functions would be unavoidably prevented by its undertaking public
rule-making procedures. “Unnecessary” means unnecessary so far
as the public is concerned, as would be the case if a minor or merely
technical amendment in which the public is not particularly interested
were involved. “Public interest” supplements the terms “imprac-
ticable” or “unnecessary”; it requires that public rule-making pro-
cedures shall not prevent an agency from operating and that, on the
other hand, lack of public interest in rule making warrants an agency
to dispense with public procedure. It should be noted that where
authority beneficial to the public does not become operative until a
rule is issued, the agency may promulgate the necessary rule immedi-
ately and rely upon supplemental procedures in the nature of a public
reconsideration of the issued rule to satisfy the requirements of this
section. Where public rule-making procedures are dispensed with,
the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) of this section would never-
theless apply.

(b) PROCEDURES.—After such notice, the agency must afford interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making at least to the
extent of submitting written data, views, or argument; and, after consider-
atation of such presentations, the agency must incorporate in any rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. However,
where other statutes require rules to be made after hearing, the require-
ments of sections 7 and 8 (relating to public hearings and decisions
thereon) apply in place of the provisions of this subsection.

This subsection states, in its first sentence, the minimum require-
ments of public rule making procedure short of statutory hearing. Under it agencies might in addition confer with industry advisory
committees, consult organizations, hold informal “hearings,” and the
like. Considerations of practicality, necessity, and public interest as
discussed in connection with subsection (a) will naturally govern the
agency's determination of the extent to which public proceedings
should go. Matters of great import, or those where the public submission of facts will be either useful to the agency or a protection to the public, should naturally be accorded more elaborate public procedures. The agency must analyze and consider all relevant matter presented. The required statement of the basis and purpose of rules issued should not only relate to the data so presented but with reasonable fullness explain the actual basis and objectives of the rule.

(c) Effective Dates.—The required publication or service of any substantive rule must be made not less than 30 days prior to its effective date except (1) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published or (2) in the case of rules recognizing exemption or relieving restriction, interpretative rules, and statements of policy.

This subsection does not provide procedures alternative to notice and other public proceedings required by the prior subsections of this section. Nor does it supersede the provisions of subsection (d) of this section. Where public procedures are omitted as authorized in certain cases, subsection (c) does not thereby become inoperative. It will afford persons affected a reasonable time to prepare for the effective date of a rule or rules or to take any other action which the issuance of rules may prompt. While certain named kinds of rules are not necessarily subject to the deferred effective date provided, it does not thereby follow that agencies are required to make such excepted types of rules operative with less notice or no notice but, instead, agencies are given discretion in those cases to fix such future effective date as they may find advisable. The other exception, upon good cause found and published, is not an "escape clause" which may be arbitrarily exercised but requires legitimate grounds supported in law and fact by the required finding. Moreover, the specification of a 30-day deferred effective date is not to be taken as a maximum, since there may be cases in which good administration or the convenience and necessity of the persons subject to the rule reasonably requires a longer period.

(d) Petitions.—Every agency is required to accord any interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.

This subsection applies not merely to effective rules existing at any time but to proposed or tentative rules. Where the latter are published, agencies should receive petitions for modification because that is one of the purposes of publishing proposed or tentative rules. Where such petitions are made, the agency must fully and promptly consider them, take such action as may be required, and pursuant to section 6 (d) notify the petitioner in case the request is denied. The agency may either grant the petition, undertake public rule making proceedings as provided by subsections (a) and (b) of this section, or deny the petition. The taking or denial of action would have the same effect and consequences as the taking or denial of action where, under presently existing legislation, the equivalent of a right of petition is recognized in interested persons. The mere filing of a petition does not require an agency to grant it, or to hold a hearing, or engage in any other public rule making proceedings. The refusal of an agency to grant the petition or to hold rule making proceedings, therefore, would not per se be subject to judicial reversal. However, the facts or considerations brought to the attention of an agency by such a petition might be such as to require the agency to act to prevent the rule from continuing or becoming vulnerable upon
judicial review, through declaratory judgment or other procedures pursuant to section 10.

SEC. 5. ADJUDICATIONS.—The various subsequent provisions of section 5 relating to adjudications apply only where the case is otherwise required by statute to be determined upon an agency hearing except that, even in that case, the following classes of operations are expressly not affected: (1) Cases subject to trial de novo in court, (2) selection or tenure of public officers other than examiners, (3) decisions resting on inspections, tests, or elections, (4) military, naval, and foreign affairs functions (5) cases in which an agency is acting for a court, and (6) the certification of employee representatives.

The general limitation of this section to cases in which other statutes require the agency to act upon or after a hearing is important. All cases are nevertheless subject to sections 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, and 12 so far as those are otherwise relevant.

The numbered exceptions remove from the operation of the section even adjudications otherwise required by statute to be made after hearing. The first, where the adjudication is subject to a judicial trial de novo, is included because whatever judgment the agency makes is effective only in a prima facie sense at most and the party aggrieved is entitled to complete judicial retrial and decision. The second, respecting the selection and tenure of officers other than examiners, is included because the selection and control of public personnel has been traditionally regarded as a discretionary function which, if to be overturned, should be done by separate legislation. The third exempts proceedings resting on inspections, tests, or elections because those methods of determination do not lend themselves to the hearing process. The fourth exempts military, naval, and foreign affairs functions for the same reasons that they are exempted from section 4; and, in any event, rarely if ever do statutes require such functions to be exercised upon hearing. The fifth, exempting cases in which an agency is acting as the agent for a court, is included because the administrative operation is subject to judicial revision in toto. The sixth, exempting the certification of employee representatives such as the Labor Board operations under section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, is included because these determinations rest so largely upon an election or the availability of an election. It should be noted that these exceptions apply only “to the extent” that the excepted subject is involved and, it may be added, only to the extent that such subjects are directly involved.

(a) Notice.—Persons entitled to notice of an agency hearing are to be duly and timely informed of (1) the time, place, and nature of the hearing, (2) the legal authority and jurisdiction under which it is to be held, and (3) the matters of fact and law asserted. Where private persons are the moving parties, respondents must give prompt notice of issues controverted in law or fact; and, in other cases the agency may require responsive pleading. In fixing the times and places for hearings the agency must give due regard to the convenience and necessity of the parties.

The specification of the content of notice, so far as legal authority and the issues are concerned, does not mean that prior to the commencement of the proceedings an agency must anticipate all developments and all possible issues. But it does mean that, either by the formal notice or otherwise in the record, it must appear that the party
affected has had ample notice of the legal and factual issues with due time to examine, consider, and prepare for them. The second sentence of the subsection applies in those cases where the agency does not control the matter of notice because private persons are the moving parties; and in such cases the respondent parties must give notice of the issues of law or fact which they controvert so that the moving party will be apprised of the issues he must sustain. The purpose of the provision is to simplify the issues for the benefit of both the parties and the deciding authority. The last sentence, requiring the convenience and necessity of the parties to be consulted in fixing the times and places for hearings, includes an agency party as well as a private party; but the agency's convenience is not to outweigh that of the private parties and, while the due and required execution of agency functions may be said to be paramount, that consideration would be controlling only where a lack of time has been unavoidable or a particular place of hearing is indispensable and does not deprive the private parties of their full opportunity for a hearing.

(b) Procedure.—The agency is required first to afford parties an opportunity for the settlement or adjustment of issues (where time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit) followed, to the extent that issues are not so settled, by hearing and decision under sections 7 and 8.

The preliminary settlement-by-consent provision of this subsection is of the greatest importance. Such adjustments may go to the whole or any part of any case. The limitation of the requirement to cases in which "time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit" does not mean that formal proceedings, to the exclusion of prior opportunity for informal settlement, lie in the discretion of any agency irrespective of the facts, legal situation presented, or practical aspects of the case. It does not mean that agencies have an arbitrary choice, or that they may consult their mere preference or convenience. It is intended to exempt only situations in which, for example, (1) time is unavoidably lacking, (2) the nature of the proceeding is such that for example (as in some forms of rule making) the great number of parties or possible parties makes it unlikely that any adjustment could be reached, and (3) the administrative function requires immediate execution in order to protect the tangible and demonstrable requirements of public interest.

(c) Separation of Functions.—Officers who preside at the taking of evidence must make the decision or recommended decision in the case. They may not consult with any person or party except openly and upon notice, save in the disposition of customary ex parte matters, and they may not be made subject to the supervision of prosecuting officers. The latter may not participate in the decisions except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. However, the subsection is not to apply in determining applications for initial licenses or the past reasonableness of rates; nor does it apply to the top agency or members thereof.

The gist of the subsection is that no investigating or prosecuting officer shall directly or indirectly in any manner influence or control the operations of hearing and deciding officers, except as a participant in public proceedings, and even then in no different fashion than the private parties or their representatives. "Ex parte matters authorized by law" means passing on requests for adjournments, continuances, filing of papers, and so forth. The exemption of applications
for initial licenses frees from the requirements of the subsection such matters as the granting of certificates of convenience and necessity which are of indefinite duration, upon the theory that in most licensing cases the original application may be much like rule making. The latter, of course, is not subject to any provision of section 5. The exemption of cases involving "the past reasonableness of rates" (if triable de novo on judicial review they would be exempted in any event) is made for the same reason. There are, however, some instances of either kind of case which tend to be accusatory in form and involve sharply controverted factual issues. Agencies should not apply the exceptions to such cases, because they are not to be interpreted as precluding fair procedure where it is required.

A further word may be said as to the last exemption—of the agency itself or the members of the board who comprise it. Such a provision is required by the very nature of administrative agencies, where the same authority is responsible for both the investigation—prosecution and the hearing and decision of cases. There, too, the exemption is not to be taken as meaning that the top authority must reserve to itself both prosecuting and deciding functions. To be sure it is ultimately responsible for all functions committed to it, but it may and should confine itself to determining policy and should delegate the actual supervision of investigations and initiation of cases to responsible subordinate officers.

(d) Declaratory Orders.—Every agency is authorized in its sound discretion to issue declaratory orders with the same effect as other orders.

This subsection does not mean that any agency empowered to issue orders may issue declaratory orders, because it is limited by the introductory clauses of section 5. Thus, such orders may be issued only where the agency is empowered by statute to hold hearings and the subject is not expressly exempted by the introductory clauses of this section.

Agencies are not required to issue declaratory orders merely because request is made therefor. Such applications have no greater effect than they now have under existing comparable legislation. "Sound discretion," moreover, would preclude the issuance of improvident orders. The administrative issuance of declaratory orders would be governed by the same basic principles that govern declaratory judgments in the courts.

Sec. 6. Ancillary Matters.—The provisions of section 6 relating to incidental or miscellaneous rights, powers, and procedures do not override contrary provisions in other parts of the bill.

The purpose of this introductory exception, which reads "except as otherwise provided in this act," is to limit, for example, the right of appearance provided in subsection (a) so as not to authorize improper ex parte conferences during formal hearings and pending formal decisions under sections 7 and 8.

(a) Appearance.—Any person compelled to appear in person before any agency or its representative is entitled to counsel. In other cases, every party may appear in person or by counsel. So far as the responsible conduct of public business permits, any interested person may appear before any agency or its responsible officers at any time for the presentation or adjustment of any matter. Agencies are to proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter so presented, with due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties. Nothing in the subsection is to
be taken as recognizing or denying the propriety of nonlawyers representing parties.

This subsection is designed to confirm and make effective the right of interested persons to appear themselves or through or with counsel before any agency. The word "party" in the second sentence is to be understood as meaning any person showing the requisite interest in the matter, since the subsection applies in connection with the exercise of any agency authority whether or not formal proceedings are available. The phrase "responsible officers", as used here and in some other provisions, both includes all officers or employees who really determine matters or exercise substantial advisory functions and excludes those whose duties are merely formal or mechanical. The third sentence does not require agencies to give notice to all who may be affected, but merely to receive the presentations of those who seek to make them. The qualifying words in the third sentence—which read "so far as the responsible conduct of public business permits"—preclude the undue harassment of agencies by numerous petty appearances by or for the same party in the same case; but they do not confer upon agencies a discretion to emasculate the subsection or preclude interested persons from presenting fully and before any responsible officer or employee their cases or proposals in full. The reference to "stop-order or other summary actions" emphasizes the necessity for an opportunity for full informal appearance where normal and formal hearing and decision requirements are not applicable or are inadequate. The requirement that agencies proceed "with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented" is a statement of legal requirement that no agency shall in effect deny relief or fail to conclude a case by mere inaction.

The final sentence provides that the subsection shall not be taken to recognize or deny the right of nonlawyers to be admitted to practice before any agency, such as the practitioners before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The use of the word "counsel" means lawyers. While the subsection does not deal with the matter expressly, the committee does not believe that agencies are justified in laying burdensome admission requirements upon members of the bar in good standing before the courts. The right of agencies to pass upon the qualifications of nonlawyers, however, is expressly recognized and preserved in the subsection.

(b) INVESTIGATIONS.—Investigative process is not to be issued or enforced except as authorized by law. Persons compelled to submit data or evidence are entitled to retain or, on payment of costs, to procure copies except that in nonpublic proceedings a witness may for good cause be limited to inspection of the official transcript.

This section is designed to preclude "fishing expeditions" and investigations beyond the jurisdiction or authority of an agency. It applies to any demand, whether or not a formal subpoena is actually issued. "Nonpublic investigatory proceeding" means those of the grand jury kind in which evidence is taken behind closed doors. The limitation, for good cause, to inspection of the official transcript is deemed necessary where evidence is taken in a case in which prosecutions may be brought later and it is obviously detrimental to the due execution of the laws to permit copies to be circulated. In those cases the witness or his counsel may be limited to inspection of the relevant portions of the transcript. Parties should in any case have
copies or an opportunity for inspection in order to assure that their
evidence is correctly set forth, to refresh their memories in the case
of stale proceedings, and to enable them to be advised by counsel.
They should also have such copies whenever needed in legal or ad-
ministrative proceedings.

(c) Subpenas.—Where agencies are by law authorized to issue sub-
penas, parties may secure them upon request and upon a statement or
showing of general relevance and reasonable scope if the agency rules so
require. Where a party contests a subpena, the court is to inquire into
the situation and, so far as the subpena is found in accordance with law,
issue an order requiring the production of the evidence under penalty of
contempt for failure then to do so.

This provision will assure private parties the same access to sub-
penas as that available to the representatives of agencies. It will
also prevent the issuance of improvident subpenas or action by an
agency requiring a detailed, unnecessary, and burdensome showing of
evidence which might fall into the hands of the party's adversaries or
investigators and prosecutors (who in any event should not have
access to such papers directly or indirectly). The subsection con-
stitutes a statutory limitation upon the issuance or enforcement of
subpenas in excess of agency authority or jurisdiction. This does
not mean, however, that courts should enter into a detailed examina-
tion of facts and issues which are committed to agency authority in
the first instance, but should, instead, inquire generally into the legal
and factual situation and be satisfied that the agency could possibly
find that it has jurisdiction. The subsection expressly recognizes the
right of parties subject to administrative subpenas to contest their
validity in the courts prior to subjecting to any form of penalty for
noncompliance.

(d) Denials.—Prompt notice is to be given of denials of requests in
any agency proceeding, accompanied by a simple statement of grounds.

This subsection affords the parties in any agency proceeding, whether
or not formal or upon hearing, the right to prompt action upon their
requests, immediate notice of such action, and a statement of the
actual grounds therefore. The latter should in any case be sufficient
to apprise the party of the basis of the denial and any other or further
administrative remedies or recourse he may have. A statement of
the actual grounds need not be made "in affirming a prior denial or
where the denial is self-explanatory." However, prior denial would
satisfy the subsection requirement only where the grounds previously
stated remain the actual grounds and sufficiently notify the party as
set forth above. A self-explanatory denial must meet the same test;
that is, the request must be in such form that its mere denial fully
informs the party of all he would otherwise be entitled to have
stated.

Sec. 7. Hearings.—Section 7 relating to agency hearings applies
only where hearings are required by sections 4 or 5.

As heretofore stated in connection with sections 4 and 5, the bill
requires no hearings unless other statutes contain such a requirement
in particular cases of either rule making or adjudication. This
section 7, therefore, is merely supplementary to sections 4 or 5 in
the relevant cases.

(a) Presiding Officers.—The hearing must be held either by the
agency, a member or members of the board which comprises it, one or
more examiners, or other officers specially provided for in or designated by other statutes. All presiding and deciding officers are to operate impartially. They may at any time withdraw if they deem themselves disqualified and, upon the filing of a proper affidavit of personal bias or disqualification against them, the agency is required to determine the matter as a part of the record and decision in the case.

This subsection provides two mutually exclusive methods of hearing—by the agency itself (or one or more of its members) or by subordinate officers. A third kind of hearing officer recognized in this subsection is one specially provided for or named in other statutes. Whoever presides is subject to the remaining provisions of the bill. They must conduct the hearing in a strictly impartial manner, rather than as the representative of an investigative or prosecuting authority, but this does not mean that they do not have the authority and duty— as a court does—to make sure that all necessary evidence is adduced and to keep the hearing orderly and efficient. The provision for affidavits of bias or personal disqualification requires a decision thereon by the agency in, and as a part of, the case; it thereby becomes subject to administrative and judicial review. That decision might be made upon the affidavit alone, as for example, the protest might be dismissed as insufficient on its face. The agency itself may hear any relevant argument or facts, or it may designate an examiner to do so. The effect which bias or disqualification shown upon the record might have would be determined by the ordinary rules of law and the other provisions of this bill. If it appeared or were discovered late, it would have the effect—where issues of fact or discretion were important and the conduct and demeanor of witnesses relevant in determining them—of rendering the recommended decisions or initial decisions of such officers invalid. This consequence will require agencies and examiners themselves to take care that they do not sit where subject to disqualification or conduct themselves in a manner which will invalidate the proceedings.

(b) HEARING POWERS.—Presiding officers, subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the agency and within its powers, have authority to (1) administer oaths, (2) issue such subpoenas as are authorized by law, (3) receive evidence and rule upon offers of proof, (4) take depositions or cause depositions to be taken, (5) regulate the hearing, (6) hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues, (7) dispose of procedural requests, (8) make decisions or recommended decisions under section 8 of the bill, and (9) exercise other authority as provided by agency rule consistent with the remainder of the bill.

This subsection does not expand the powers of agencies. It is designed to assure that the presiding officer will perform a real function rather than serve merely as a notary or policeman. He would have and should independently exercise all the powers numbered in the subsection. The agency itself—which must ultimately either decide the case, or consider reviewing it, or hear appeals from the examiner's decision—should not in effect conduct hearings from behind the scenes where it cannot know the detailed happenings in the hearing room and does not hear or see the private parties.

c) EVIDENCE.—Except as statutes otherwise provide, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof. While any evidence may be received, as a matter of policy agencies are required to provide for the exclusion of irrelevant and unduly repetitious evidence and no sanction
may be imposed or rule or order be issued except as supported by relevant, reliable, and probative evidence. Any party may present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, submit rebuttal evidence, and conduct reasonable cross-examination. However, in the case of rule making or determining applications for initial licenses, the agency may adopt procedures for the submission of evidence in written form so far as the interest of any party will not be prejudiced thereby.

That the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof means not only that the party initiating the proceeding has the general burden of coming forward with a prima facie case but that other parties, who are proponents of some different result, also for that purpose have a burden to maintain. Similarly the requirement that no sanction be imposed or rule or order be issued except upon evidence of the kind specified means that the proponents of a denial of relief must sustain such denial by that kind of evidence. For example, credible and credited evidence submitted by the applicant for a license may not be ignored except upon the requisite kind and quality of contrary evidence. No agency is authorized to stand mute and arbitrarily disbelieve credible evidence. Except as applicants for a license or other privilege may be required to come forward with a prima facie showing, no agency is entitled to presume that the conduct of any person or status of any enterprise is unlawful or improper.

The second and primary sentence of the subsection is framed on the theory that an administrative hearing is to be compared with an equity proceeding in the courts. The mere admission of evidence is not to be taken as prejudicial error (there being no lay jury to be protected from improper influence) although irrelevant and unduly repetitious evidence is to be excluded as a matter of efficiency and good practice; and no finding or conclusion may be entered except upon evidence which is plainly of the requisite materiality and competence; that is, “relevant, reliable, and probative evidence.” Thus while the exclusionary “rules of evidence” do not apply except as the agency may as a matter of good practice simplify the hearing and record by excluding obviously improper or unnecessary evidence, the standards and principles of probity and reliability of evidence must be the same as those prevailing in courts of law or equity in nonadministrative cases. There are no real rules of probity and reliability even in courts of law, but there are certain standards and principles—usually applied tacitly and resting mainly upon common sense—which people engaged in the conduct of responsible affairs instinctively understand and act upon. They may vary with the circumstances and kind of case, but they exist and must be rationally applied. These principles, under this subsection, are to govern in administrative proceedings.

The right of cross-examination extends, in a proper case, to written evidence submitted pursuant to the last sentence of the subsection as well as to cases in which oral or documentary evidence is received in open hearing. Even in the latter case, subject to the appropriate safeguards, technical data may as a matter of convenience be reduced to writing and introduced as in courts. The written evidence provision of the last sentence of the subsection is designed to cover situations in which, as a matter of general rule or practice, the submission of the whole or substantial portions of the evidence in a case is done in written form. In those situations, however, the provision limits
the practice to specified classes of cases and, even then, only where and to the extent that "the interest of any party will not be prejudiced thereby." To the extent that cross-examination is necessary to bring out the truth, the party should have it. Also, an adequate opportunity must be provided for a party to prepare and submit appropriate rebuttal evidence.

(d) Record.—The record of evidence taken and papers filed is exclusive for decision and, upon payment of costs, is available to the parties. Where decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence of record, any party may on timely request show the contrary.

The "official notice" mentioned relates to the administrative practice of taking facts as shown and true though not in the record. This is done by analogy to judicial notice familiar in court procedure. Where agencies take such notice they must so state on the record or in their decisions and then afford the parties an opportunity to show the contrary.

Sec. 8. Decisions.—Section 8 applies to cases in which a hearing is required to be conducted pursuant to section 7.

Like section 7, upon which section 8 depends, this section is supplementary to sections 4 and 5 in cases in which agency action is required to be taken after hearing provided by statute and not otherwise excepted from the operation of sections 4 or 5.

(a) Action by Subordinates.—Where the agency has not presided at the reception of the evidence, the presiding officer (or any other officer qualified to preside, in cases exempted from subsec. (c) of sec. 5) must make the initial decision unless the agency—by general rule or in a particular case—undertakes to make the initial decision. If the presiding officer makes the initial decision, it becomes the decision of the agency in the absence of an appeal to the agency or review by the agency on its own motion. On such appeal or review, the agency has all the powers it would have had in making the initial decision. If the agency makes the initial decision without having presided at the taking of the evidence, whatever officer took the evidence must first make a recommended decision except that, in rule making or determining applications for initial licenses, (1) the agency may instead issue a tentative decision or any of its responsible officers may recommend a decision or (2) such intermediate procedure may be wholly omitted in any case in which the agency finds on the record that the execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably so requires.

This subsection requires in effect that the officer who presided shall make the initial decision in the case, or the agency may do so, but in the latter event the officer who presided must make a recommended decision. However, the recommended decision may be supplied by a tentative agency decision or a proposed decision by its responsible officers in certain cases or, where the due and timely execution of agency functions will not permit such intermediate action, it may be omitted entirely. The parties might agree to waive such intermediate procedure in any case. The reference to an appeal or review by the agency does not cut off any further appeals to or review by any existing superior agency authorized to hear appeals or review decisions of the first agency. The agency for which the examiner or other presiding officer functions may not dispense with the recommended decision except as provided by the subsection.
The provision that on agency review of initial examiners' decisions the agency shall have all the powers it would have had in making the initial decision does not mean that the initial examiners' decisions (or their recommended decisions) are without effect. They become a part of the record in the case. They would be of consequence, for example, to the extent that material facts in any case depend on the determination of credibility of witnesses as shown by their demeanor or conduct at the hearing. Since the examiner system is made necessary because agencies themselves cannot hear cases, some device must be used to bridge the gap between the officials who hear and those who decide cases.

The alternative intermediate procedure which an agency may adopt in rule making or determining applications for initial licenses lies in the discretion of the agency. In order to simplify the bill, the exception which confers this discretion is broadly drawn. However, it may be noted that even in those cases, if issues of fact are sharply controverted or the case or class of cases tends to become accusatory in nature, sound practice would require the agency to adopt the intermediate recommended decision procedure.

(b) Submittals and Decisions.—Prior to each recommended or other decision or review the parties must be given an opportunity to submit for the full consideration of deciding officers (1) proposed findings and conclusions or (2) exceptions to recommended decisions or other decisions being appealed or reviewed, and (3) supporting reasons for such findings, conclusions, or exceptions. All recommended or other decisions become a part of the record and must include (1) findings and conclusions, as well as the basis therefor, upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented by the record and (2) the appropriate agency action or denial.

Ordinarily proposed findings and conclusions are submitted only to the officers making the initial decision, and the parties present exceptions thereafter if they contest the result. However, such exceptions may in form or effect include proposed findings or conclusions for the reviewing authority to consider as a part of the exceptions. “Supporting reasons” means that briefs on the law and facts must be received and fully considered by every recommending, deciding, or reviewing officer. They must also hear such oral argument as may be required by law. Where the issues of fact are serious and the case becomes one adversary in character, the agency should provide for oral argument before all recommending, deciding, or reviewing officers at least as a matter of good practice.

The requirement that the agency must state the basis for its findings and conclusions means that such findings and conclusions must be sufficiently related to the record as to advise the parties of their record basis. Most agencies will do so by opinions which reason and relate the issues of fact, law, and discretion. Statements of reasons, however, may be long or short as the nature of the case and the novelty or complexity of the issues may require.

Findings and conclusions must include all the relevant issues presented by the record in the light of the law involved. They may be few or many. A particular conclusion of law may render certain issues and findings immaterial, or vice versa. Where oral testimony is conflicting or subject to doubt of its credibility, the credibility of witnesses would be a necessary finding if the facts are material. It should also be noted that the relevant issues extend to matters of
administrative discretion as well as of law and fact. This is important because agencies often determine whether they have power to act rather than whether their discretion should be exercised or how it should be exercised. Furthermore, without a disclosure of the basis for the exercise of, or failure to exercise, discretion, the parties are unable to determine what other or additional facts they might offer by way of rehearing or reconsideration of decisions.

SEC. 9. SANCTIONS AND POWERS.—Section 9 relating to powers and sanctions refers to the exercise of any power or authority by an agency.

Unlike sections 7 and 8, this section applies in all relevant cases, whether or not the agency is required by statute to proceed upon hearing or in any special manner. It also applies to any power or authority that an agency may assume to exercise.

(a) In General.—No sanction may be imposed or substantive rule or order be issued except within the jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.

This subsection embraces both substantive and procedural requirements of law. It means that agencies may not undertake anything which statutes or other appropriate sources of authority (such as treaties) do not authorize them to do. Where these sources are specific in the authority granted, no additional authority may be assumed. Where these sources are general, no authority beyond the generality granted may be exercised. In particular, agencies may not impose sanctions which have not been specifically or generally provided for them to impose. Thus, an agency which is authorized only to issue cease-and-desist orders may not set up a licensing system; and conversely a licensing authority may not assume to issue desist orders. A rule-making authority may not undertake to adjudicate cases, and vice versa. Of course some statutes confer upon the same agency authority to exercise more than one of these forms of regulation. An agency authorized to regulate trade practices may not regulate banking, and so on. Similarly, no agency may undertake directly or indirectly to exercise the functions of some other agency. The subsection confines each agency to the jurisdiction delegated to it by law.

(b) Licenses.—Agencies are required, with due regard for the rights or privileges of all the interested parties or persons adversely affected, to proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude and decide proceedings on applications for licenses. They are not to withdraw a license without first giving the licensee notice in writing and an opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements, except in cases of willfulness or those in which public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise. In businesses of a continuing nature, no license expires until timely applications for new licenses or renewals are determined by the agency.

This section operates in all cases whether or not hearing is required. The requirement of dispatch means that agencies must proceed as rapidly as is feasible and practicable, rather than at their own convenience. Undue delays are subject to correction by mandatory injunction pursuant to section 10. The exceptions to the second sentence, regarding revocations, apply only where the demonstrable facts fully and fairly warrant the application of the exceptions. Willfulness must be manifest. The same is true of “public health, interest, or safety.” The standard of “public * * * interest”
means a situation requiring immediate action irrespective of the equities or injuries to the licensee, but the term does not confer upon agencies an arbitrary discretion to ignore the requirement of notice and an opportunity to demonstrate compliance. However, this limitation does not apply to temporary permits or temporary licenses.

Sec. 10. Judicial Review.—Section 10 on judicial review does not apply in any situation so far as there are involved matters with respect to which statutes preclude judicial review or agency action is by law committed to agency discretion.

Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in effect be blank checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board.

The basic exception of matters committed to agency discretion would apply even if not stated at the outset. If, for example, statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply, courts of course have no statutory question to review. That situation cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure act but must be treated by the revision of statutes conferring administrative powers. However, where statutory standards, definitions, or other grants of power deny or require action in given situations or confine an agency within limits as required by the Constitution, then the determination of the facts does not lie in agency discretion but must be supported by either the administrative or judicial record.

(a) Right of Review.—Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected within the meaning of any statute, is entitled to judicial review.

This subsection confers a right of review upon any person adversely affected in fact by agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute. The phrase “legal wrong” means such a wrong as is specified in subsection (e) of this section. It means that something more than mere adverse personal effect must be shown—that is, that the adverse effect must be an illegal effect. The law so made relevant is not just constitutional law but any and all applicable law.

(b) Form and Venue of Action.—The technical form of proceeding for judicial review is any special proceeding provided by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any relevant form of legal action (such as those for declaratory judgments or injunctions) in any court of competent jurisdiction. Moreover, agency action is also made subject to judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such review is provided by law.

The first sentence of this subsection is an express statutory recognition of the so-called common-law actions as being appropriate and authorized means of judicial review, operative whenever special forms of judicial review are lacking or insufficient. The declaratory judgment procedure, for example, may be operative before statutory forms of review are available; and in a proper case it may be utilized to determine the validity or application of agency action. The expression “special statutory review” means not only special review proceedings wholly created by statute, but so-called common-law forms referred to and adopted by statute as the appropriate mode of
review. The exception from “prior, adequate, and exclusive * * * review” in the second sentence is operative only where statutes, either expressly or as they are interpreted, require parties to resort to some special statutory form of judicial review which is prior in time and adequate to the case.

(c) REVIEWABLE ACTS.—Agency action made reviewable specially by statute or final agency action for which there is no other adequate judicial remedy is subject to judicial review. In addition, preliminary or procedural matters not directly subject to review are reviewable upon the review of final actions. Except as statutes may expressly require otherwise, agency action is final whether or not there has been presented or determined any application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or (unless the agency otherwise requires by rule) for an appeal to superior agency authority.

“Final” action includes any effective agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court. “Reconsideration” includes reopening, rehearing, etc.

The last clause, permitting agencies to require by rule that an appeal be taken to superior agency authority before judicial review may be sought, is designed to implement the provisions of section 8 (a). Pursuant to that subsection an agency may permit an examiner to make the initial decision in a case, which becomes the agency’s decision in the absence of an appeal to or review by the agency. If there is such review or appeal, the examiner’s initial decision becomes inoperative until the agency determines the matter. For that reason this subsection permits an agency also to require by rule that, if any party is not satisfied with the initial decision of a subordinate hearing officer, the party must first appeal to the agency (the decision meanwhile being inoperative) before resorting to the courts. In no case may appeal to “superior agency authority” be required by rule unless the administrative decision meanwhile is inoperative, because otherwise the effect of such a requirement would be to subject the party to the agency action and to repetitious administrative process without recourse. There is a fundamental inconsistency in requiring a person to continue “exhausting” administrative processes after administrative action has become, and while it remains, effective.

(d) INTERIM RELIEF.—Pending judicial review any agency may postpone the effective date of its action. Upon conditions and as may be necessary to prevent irreparable injury, any reviewing court may postpone the effective date of any agency action or preserve the status quo pending conclusion of review proceedings.

This section permits either agencies or courts, if the proper showing be made, to maintain the status quo. While it would not permit a court to grant an initial license, it provides intermediate judicial relief for every other situation in order to make judicial review effective. The authority granted is equitable and should be used by both agencies and courts to prevent irreparable injury or afford parties an adequate judicial remedy.

(e) SCOPE OF REVIEW.—Reviewing courts are required to decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of any agency action. They must (A) compel action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed and (B) hold unlawful any action, findings, or conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, (2) contrary to the Constitution, (3) contrary to statutes or short of statutory right, (4) without observance of procedure required by law, (5)
unsuported by substantial evidence upon the administrative record where the agency is authorized by statute to hold hearings subject to sections 7 and 8, or (6) unwarranted by the facts so far as the latter are subject to trial de novo. In making these determinations the court is to consider the whole record or such parts as the parties may cite, and due account must be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

This subsection provides that questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis and it also lists the several categories of questions of law. It expressly recognizes the right of properly interested parties to compel agencies to act where they improvidently refuse to act. “Finding” and “conclusion” also mean failure to find or conclude as the law and the record may require. “Short of statutory right” means that agencies are not authorized to give partial relief where a party demonstrates his right to the whole. “Without observance of procedure required by law” means not only the procedures required by this bill but any other procedures the law may require. “Substantial evidence” means evidence which on the whole record is clearly substantial, sufficient to support a finding or conclusion under section 7 (c), and material to the issues.

The sixth category, respecting the establishment of facts upon trial de novo, would require the reviewing court to determine the facts in any case of adjudication not subject to sections 7 and 8. It would also require the judicial determination of facts in connection with rule making or any other conceivable form of agency action to the extent that the facts were relevant to any pertinent issues of law presented. For example, statutes providing for “reparation orders”, in which agencies determine damages and award money judgments, usually state that the money orders issued are merely prima facie evidence in the courts and the parties subject to them are permitted to introduce evidence in the court in which the enforcement action is pending. In other cases, the test is whether there has been a statutory administrative hearing of the facts which is adequate and exclusive for purposes of review. Thus, where adjudications such as tax assessments are not made upon an administrative hearing and record, contests may involve a trial of the facts in the Tax Court or the United States district courts. Where administrative agencies deny parties money to which they are entitled by statute or rule, the claimants may sue as for any other claim and in so doing try out the facts in the Court of Claims or United States district courts as the case may be. Where a court enforces or applies an administrative rule, the party to whom it is applied may offer evidence and show the facts upon which he bases a contention that he is not subject to the terms of the rule. Where for example an affected party claims in a judicial proceeding that a rule issued without an administrative hearing (and not required to be issued after such hearing) is invalid, he may show the facts upon which he predicates such invalidity.

The requirement of review upon “the whole record” means that courts may not look only to the case presented by one party, since other evidence may weaken or even indisputably destroy that case. The requirement that account shall be taken “of the rule of prejudicial error” means that a procedural omission which has been cured by affording the party the procedure to which he was originally entitled is not a reversible error.

Sec. 11. Examiners.—Subject to the civil-service and other laws not inconsistent with this bill, agencies are required to appoint such examiners
as may be necessary for proceedings under sections 7 and 8, who are to be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable and to perform no inconsistent duties. They are removable only for good cause determined by the Civil Service Commission after opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof. They are to receive compensation prescribed by the Commission independently of agency recommendations or ratings. One agency may, with the consent of another and upon selection by the Commission, borrow examiners from another. The Commission is given the necessary powers to operate under this section.

That examiners be “qualified and competent” requires the Civil Service Commission to fix appropriate qualifications and the agencies to seek fit persons. In view of the tenure and compensation requirements of the section, designed to make examiners largely independent, self-interest and due concern for the proper performance of public functions will inevitably move agencies to secure the highest type of examiners.

The purpose of this section is to render examiners independent and secure in their tenure and compensation. The section thus takes a different ground than the present situation, in which examiners are mere employees of an agency, and other proposals for a completely separate “examiners’ pool” from which agencies might draw for hearing officers. Recognizing that the entire tradition of the Civil Service Commission is directed toward security of tenure, it seems wise to put that tradition to use in the present case. However, additional powers are conferred upon the Commission. It must afford any examiner an opportunity for a hearing before acceding to an agency request for removal, and even then its action would be subject to judicial review. The hearing and decision would be made under sections 7 and 8 of this bill. The requirement of assignment of examiners “in rotation” prevents an agency from disfavoring an examiner by rendering him inactive.

In the matter of examiners’ compensation the section adds greatly to the Commission’s powers and function. It must prescribe and adjust examiners’ salaries, independently of agency ratings and recommendations. The stated inapplicability of specified sections of the Classification Act carries into effect that authority. The Commission would exercise its powers by classifying examiners’ positions and, upon customary examination through its agents, shift examiners to superior classifications or higher grades as their experience and duties may require. The Commission might consult the agency, as it now does in setting up positions or reclassifying positions, but it would act upon its own responsibility and with the objects of the bill in mind.

SEC. 12. CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT.—Nothing in the bill is to diminish constitutional rights or limit or repeal additional requirements of law. Requirements of evidence and procedure are to apply equally to agencies and private persons except as otherwise provided by law. The unconstitutionality of any portion or application of the bill is not to affect other portions or applications. Agencies are granted all authority necessary to comply with the bill. Subsequent legislation is not to modify the bill except as it may do so expressly. The bill would become law three months after its approval except that sections 7 and 8 take effect six months after approval, the requirements of section 11 become effective a year after approval, and no requirement is mandatory as to any agency proceeding initiated prior to the effective date of such requirement.
The word "initiated" in the final clause of the section means a proceeding formally begun as by the issuance of a complaint by the agency (irrespective of prior charges or investigations) or of notice of a rule-making hearing. As to new cases, the effective dates provided in section 12 are deferred longer so far as sections 7 and 8 are concerned in order to afford agencies ample time to prepare and make any adjustments required in their procedures. The selection of examiners under section 11 is deferred for a year in order to permit present military service personnel an opportunity to qualify for these positions.

V. GENERAL COMMENTS

The bill is designed to operate as a whole and, as previously stated, its provisions are interrelated. At the same time, however, there are certain provisions which touch on subjects long regarded as of the highest importance. On those subjects, such as the separation of examiners from the agencies they serve, there has been a wide divergence of views. The committee has in such cases taken the course which it believes will suffice without being excessive. Moreover, amendatory or supplementary legislation can supply any deficiency which experience discloses in those cases. The committee believes that special note should be made of the following situations:

The exemption of rule making and determining initial applications for licenses from provisions of sections 5 (c), 7 (c), and 8 (a) may require change if, in practice, it develops that they are too broad. Earlier in this report, in commenting upon some of those provisions, the committee has expressed its reasons for the language used and has stated that, where cases present sharply contested issues of fact, agencies should not as a matter of good practice take advantage of the exemptions.

Should the preservation in section 7 (a) of the "conduct of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to statute" prove to be a loophole for avoidance of the examiner system in any real sense, corrective legislation would be necessary. That provision is not intended to permit agencies to avoid the use of examiners but to preserve special statutory types of hearing officers who contribute something more than examiners could contribute and at the same time assure the parties fair and impartial procedure.

The basic provision respecting evidence in section 7 (c)—requiring that any agency action must be supported by plainly "relevant, reliable, and probative evidence"—will require full compliance by agencies and diligent enforcement by reviewing courts. Should that language prove insufficient to fix and maintain the standards of proof, supplemental legislation will become necessary.

The "substantial evidence" rule set forth in section 10 (e) is exceedingly important. As a matter of language, substantial evidence would seem to be an adequate expression of law. The difficulty comes about in the practice of agencies to rely upon (and of courts to tacitly approve) something less—to rely upon suspicion, surmise, implications, or plainly incredible evidence. It will be the duty of the courts to determine in the final analysis and in the exercise of their independent judgment, whether on the whole record the evidence in a given instance is sufficiently substantial to support a finding, conclusion, or other agency action as a matter of law. In
the first instance, however, it will be the function of the agency to determine the sufficiency of the evidence upon which it acts—and the proper performance of its public duties will require it to undertake this inquiry in a careful and dispassionate manner. Should these objectives of the bill as worded fail, supplemental legislation will be required.

The foregoing are by no means all the provisions which will require vigilant attention to assure their proper operation. Almost any provision of the bill, if wrongly interpreted or minimized, may present occasion for supplemental legislation. On the other hand, should it appear at any time that the requirements result in some undue impairment of a particular administrative function, appropriate amendments or exceptions may be in order.

**INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT.**—Except in a few respects, this is not a measure conferring administrative powers but is one laying down definitions and stating limitations. These definitions and limitations must, to be sure, be interpreted and applied by agencies affected by them in the first instance. But the enforcement of the bill, by the independent judicial interpretation and application of its terms, is a function which is clearly conferred upon the courts in the final analysis.

It will thus be the duty of reviewing courts to prevent avoidance of the requirements of the bill by any manner or form of indirection, and to determine the meaning of the words and phrases used. For example, in several provisions the expression "good cause" is used. The cause so specified must be interpreted by the context of the provision in which it is found and the purpose of the entire section and bill. Cause found must be real and demonstrable. If the agency is proceeding upon a statutory hearing and record, the cause will appear there; otherwise it must be such that the agency may show the facts and considerations warranting the finding in any proceeding in which the finding is challenged. The same would be true in the case of findings other than of good cause, required in the bill. As has been said, these findings must in the first instance be made by the agency concerned but, in the final analysis, their propriety in law and on the facts must be sustainable upon inquiry by a reviewing court.

Nevertheless, in the nature of things, for most practical purposes it is to the agencies that the Congress and the people must look for fair administration of the laws and compliance with this bill. Judicial review is of utmost importance, but it can be operative in relatively few cases because of the cost and general hazards of litigation. It is indispensable since its mere existence generally precludes the arbitrary exercise of powers or assumption of powers not granted. Yet, in the vast majority of cases the agency concerned usually speaks the first and last word. For that reason the agencies must make the first, primary, and most far-reaching effort to comply with the terms and the spirit of this bill.

It is the view of the committee that this bill is not an indictment of administrative agencies or administrative processes. The committee takes no position one way or the other on these questions. By enacting this bill, the Congress—expressing the will of the people—will be laying down for the guidance of all branches of the Government and all private interests in the country a policy respecting the minimum requirements of fair administrative procedure.

The committee recommends that the bill as reported be enacted.
APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

That this Act may be cited as the "Administrative Procedure Act"

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 2. As used in this Act—

(a) AGENCY.—"Agency" means each authority (whether or not within or subject to review by another agency) of the Government of the United States other than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to repeal delegations of authority as provided by law. Except as to the requirements of section 8, there shall be excluded from the operation of this Act (1) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes determined by them, (2) courts martial and military commissions, (3) military or naval authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory, or (4) functions which by law expire on the termination of present hostilities, within any fixed period thereafter, or before July 1, 1947, and the functions conferred by the following statutes: Selective Training and Service Act of 1940; Contract Settlement Act of 1944; Surplus Property Act of 1944.

(b) PERSON AND PARTY.—"Person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, or public or private organizations of any character other than agencies. "Party" includes any person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes.

(c) RULE AND RULE MAKING.—"Rule" means the whole or any part of any agency statement of general applicability designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency. "Rule making" means agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services, or allowances, therefor, or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing.

(d) ORDER AND ADJUDICATION.—"Order" means the whole or any part of the final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, or declaratory in form) of any agency in any matter other than rule making but including licensing. "Adjudication" means agency process for the formulation of an order.

(e) LICENSE AND LICENSING.—"License" includes the whole or part of any agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption, or other form of permission. "Licensing" includes agency process respecting the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification, or conditioning of a license.

(f) SANCTION AND RELIEF.—"Sanction" includes the whole or part of any agency (1) prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of any person; (2) withholding of relief; (3) imposition of any form of penalty or fine; (4) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of property; (5) assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, costs, charges, or fees; (6) requirement, revocation, or suspension of a license; or (7) taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. "Relief" includes the whole or part of any agency (1) grant of money, assistance, license, authority, exemption, exception, privilege, or remedy; (2) recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption, or exception; or (8) taking of any other action beneficial to any person.

(g) AGENCY PROCEEDING AND ACTION.—"Agency proceeding" means any agency process as defined in subsections (c), (d), and (e) of this section. For the purposes of section 10, "agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.
SEC. 3. Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency—

(a) RULES.—Every agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register (1) descriptions of its central and field organization; (2) the established places and methods whereby the public may secure information or make submittals or requests; (3) statements of the general course and method by which its rule making and adjudicating functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal or informal procedures available as well as forms and instructions as to the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations; and (4) substantive rules adopted as authorized by law and statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the public. No person shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or procedure not so published.

(b) OPINIONS AND ORDERS.—Every agency shall publish or, in accordance with published rule, make available to public inspection all final opinions or orders in the adjudication of cases except those required for good cause to be held confidential and not cited as precedents.

(c) PUBLIC RECORDS.—Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause found.

Rule Making

SEC. 4. Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any military, naval, or foreign affairs function of the United States or (2) any matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts—

(a) NOTICE.—General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register and shall include (1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. Except where notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection shall not apply to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice, or in any situation in which the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.

(b) PROCEDURES.—After notice required by this section, the agency shall afford interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or argument with or without opportunity to present the same orally in any manner; and, after consideration of all relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in any rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. Where rules are required by law to be made upon the record after opportunity for or upon an agency hearing, the requirements of sections 7 and 8 shall apply in place of the provisions of this subsection.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATES.—The required publication or service of any substantive rule (other than one granting or recognizing exemption or relieving restriction or interpretative rules and statements of policy) shall be made not less than thirty days prior to the effective date thereof except as otherwise provided by the agency upon good cause found and published with the rule.

(d) PETITIONS.—Every agency shall accord any interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.

Adjudication

SEC. 5. In every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved (1) any matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in any court; (2) the selection or tenure of an officer or employee of the United States other than examiners appointed pursuant to section 11; (3) proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or elections; (4) the conduct of military, naval, or foreign affairs functions; (5) cases in which an agency is acting as an agent for a court; and (6) the certification of employee representatives—

(a) NOTICE.—Persons entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of (1) the time, place, and nature thereof; (2) the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; and (3) the matters of fact and law asserted.
In instances in which private persons are the moving parties, other parties to the proceeding shall give prompt notice of issues controverted in fact or law; and in other instances agencies may by rule require responsive pleading. In fixing the times and places for hearings, due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives.

(b) Procedure.—The agency shall afford all interested parties opportunity for (1) the submission and consideration of facts, argument, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment where time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit, and (2) to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine any controversy by consent, hearing and decision upon notice and in conformity with sections 7 and 8.

(c) Separation of Functions.—The same officers who preside at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 7 shall make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 8 except where such officers become unavailable to the agency. Save to the extent required for the disposition of exe parte matters as authorized by law, no such officer shall consult any person or party on any fact in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; nor shall such officer be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency. No officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency shall, in that case or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 8 except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This subsection shall not apply in determining applications for initial licenses or the past reasonableness of rates; nor shall it be applicable in any manner to the agency or any member or members of the body comprising the agency.

(d) Declaratory Orders.—The agency is authorized in its sound discretion, with like effect as in the case of other orders, to issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty.

Ancillary Matters

Sec. 6. Except as otherwise provided in this Act—

(a) Appearance.—Any person compelled to appear in person before any agency or representative thereof shall be accorded the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel, or if permitted by the agency, by other qualified representative. Every party shall be accorded the right to appear in person or by or with counsel or other duly qualified representative in any agency proceeding. So far as the responsible conduct of public business permits, any interested person may appear before any agency or its responsible officers or employees for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of any issue, request, or controversy in any proceeding or in connection with any agency function, including stop-order or other summary actions. Every agency shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it except that due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives. Nothing herein shall be construed either to grant or to deny to any person who is not a lawyer the right to appear for or represent others before any agency or in any agency proceeding.

(b) Investigations.—No process, requirement of a report, inspection, or other investigative act or demand shall be issued, made, or enforced in any manner or for any purpose except as authorized by law. Every person compelled to submit data or evidence shall be entitled to retain or, on payment of lawfully prescribed costs, procure a copy or transcript thereof, except that in a nonpublic investigatory proceeding the witness may for good cause be limited to inspection of the official transcript of his testimony.

(c) Subpoenas.—Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be issued to any party upon request and, as may be required by rules of procedure, upon a statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought. Upon contest the court shall sustain any such subpoena or similar process or demand to the extent that it is found to be in accordance with law and, in any proceeding for enforcement, shall issue an order requiring the appearance of the witness or the production of the evidence or data under penalty of punishment for contempt in case of contumacious failure to do so.

(d) Denials.—Prompt notice shall be given of the denial in whole or in part of any written application, petition, or other request of any interested person made in connection with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior denial or where the denial is self-explanatory, such notice shall be accompanied by a simple statement of grounds.
HEARINGS

SEC. 7. In hearings which section 4 or 5 requires to be conducted pursuant to this section—

(a) PRESIDING OFFICERS.—There shall preside at the taking of evidence (1) the agency, (2) one or more members of the body which comprises the agency, or (3) one or more examiners appointed as provided in this Act; but nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to statute. The functions of all presiding officers and of officers participating in decisions in conformity with section 8 shall be conducted in an impartial manner. Any such officer may at any time withdraw if he deems himself disqualified; and, upon the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualification of any such officer, the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record and decision in the case.

(b) HEARING POWERS.—Officers presiding at hearings shall have authority, subject to the published rules of the agency and within its powers, to (1) administer oaths and affirmations, (2) issue subpoenas authorized by law, (3) rule upon offers of proof and receive relevant evidence, (4) take or cause depositions to be taken whenever the ends of justice would be served thereby, (5) regulate the course of the hearing, (6) hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues by consent of the parties, (7) dispose of procedural requests or similar matters, (8) make decisions or recommend decisions in conformity with section 8, and (9) take any other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this Act.

(c) EVIDENCE.—Except as statutes otherwise provide, the proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof. Any evidence, oral or documentary, may be received, but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence and no sanction shall be imposed or rule or order be issued except as supported by relevant, reliable, and probative evidence.

Every party shall have the right to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses any agency may, where the interest of any party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in written form.

(d) RECORD.—The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, shall constitute the exclusive record for decision in accordance with section 8 and, upon payment of lawfully prescribed costs, shall be made available to the parties. Where any agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, any party shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show the contrary.

DECISIONS

SEC. 8. In cases in which a hearing is required to be conducted in conformity with section 7—

(a) ACTION BY SUBORDINATES.—In cases in which the agency has not presided at the reception of the evidence, the officer who presided (or, in cases not subject to subsection (c) of section 5, any other officer or officers qualified to preside at hearings pursuant to section 7) shall initially decide the case or the agency shall require (in specific cases or by general rule) the entire record to be certified to it for initial decision. Whenever such officers make the initial decision and in the absence of either an appeal to the agency or review upon motion of the agency within time provided by rule, such decision shall without further proceedings then become the decision of the agency.

On appeal from or review of the initial decisions of such officers the agency shall, except as it may limit the issues upon notice or by rule, have all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision. Whenever the agency makes the initial decision without having presided at the reception of the evidence, such officers shall first recommend a decision except that in rule making or determining applications for initial licenses (1) in lieu thereof the agency may issue a tentative decision or any of its responsible officers may recommend a decision or (2) any such procedure may be omitted in any case in which the agency finds upon the record that due and timely execution of its function imperatively and unavoidably so requires.

(b) SUBMITTALS AND DECISIONS.—Prior to each recommended, initial, or tentative decision, or decision upon agency review of the decision of subordinate officers the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit for the consideration of the officers participating in such decisions (1) proposed findings and conclusions, or
(2) exceptions to the decisions or recommended decisions of subordinate officers or to tentative agency decisions, and (3) supporting reasons for such exceptions or proposed findings or conclusions. All decisions (including initial, recommended, or tentative decisions) shall become a part of the record and include a statement of (1) findings and conclusions, as well as the basis therefor, upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented; and (2) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.

Sanctions and Powers

Sec. 9. In the exercise of any power or authority—
(a) In General.—No sanction shall be imposed or substantive rule or order be issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.
(b) Licensees.—In any case in which application is made for a license required by law the agency, with due regard to the rights or privileges of all the interested parties or adversely affected persons and with reasonable dispatch, shall set and complete any proceedings required to be conducted pursuant to sections 7 and 8 of this Act or other proceedings required by law and shall make its decision. Except in cases of willfulness or those in which public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise, no withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or annulment of any license shall be lawful unless, prior to the institution of agency proceedings therefor, facts or conduct which may warrant such action shall have been called to the attention of the licensees by the agency in writing and the licensees shall have been accorded opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements. In any case in which the licensees has, in accordance with agency rules, made timely and sufficient application for a renewal or a new license, no license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature shall expire until such application shall have been finally determined by the agency.

Judicial Review

Sec. 10. Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2), agency action is by law committed to agency discretion—
(a) Right of Review.—Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
(b) Form and Venue of Action.—The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction. Agency action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such review is provided by law.
(c) Reviewable Acts.—Every agency action made reviewable by statute and every final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial review. Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable shall be subject to review upon the review of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action shall be final whether or not there has been presented or determined any application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or (unless the agency otherwise requires by rule) for an appeal to superior agency authority.
(d) Interim Relief.—Pending judicial review any agency is authorized, where it finds that justice so requires, to postpone the effective date of any action taken by it. Upon such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, every reviewing court (including every court to which a case may be taken on appeal from or upon application for certiorari or other writ to a reviewing court) is authorized to issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of any agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
(e) Scope of Review.—So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial
evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by the parties, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.

Examiners

Sec. 11. Subject to the civil-service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent with this Act, there shall be appointed by and for each agency as many qualified and competent examiners as may be necessary for proceedings pursuant to sections 7 and 8, who shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable and shall perform no duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as examiners. Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) after opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof. Examiners shall receive compensation prescribed by the Commission independently of agency recommendations or ratings and in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, except that the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) of section 7 of said Act, as amended, and the provisions of section 9 of said Act, as amended, shall not be applicable. Agencies occasionally or temporarily insufficiently staffed may utilize examiners selected by the Commission from and with the consent of other agencies. For the purposes of this section, the Commission is authorized to make investigations, require reports by agencies, issue reports, including an annual report to the Congress, promulgate rules, appoint such advisory committees as may be deemed necessary, recommend legislation, subpoena witnesses or records, and pay witness fees as established for the United States courts.

Construction and Effect

Sec. 12. Nothing in this Act shall be held to diminish the constitutional rights of any person or to limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law. Except as otherwise required by law, all requirements or privileges relating to evidence or procedure shall apply equally to agencies and persons. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof is held invalid, the remainder of this Act or other applications of such provision shall not be affected. Every agency is granted all authority necessary to comply with the requirements of this Act through the issuance of rules or otherwise. No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall so expressly. This Act shall take effect three months after its approval except that sections 7 and 8 shall take effect six months after such approval, the requirement of the selection of examiners pursuant to section 11 shall not become effective until one year after such approval, and no procedural requirement shall be mandatory as to any agency proceeding initiated prior to the effective date of such requirement.

Appendix B

Hon. Pat McCarran,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.

My Dear Senator: You have asked me to comment on S. 7, a bill to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, in the form in which it appears in the revised committee print issued October 5, 1945. I appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed legislation.

For more than a decade there has been pending in the Congress legislation in one form or another designed to deal horizontally with the subject of administrative procedure, so as to overcome the confusion which inevitably has resulted from leaving to basic agency statutes the prescription of the procedures to be followed or, in many instances, the delegation of authority to agencies to prescribe their own procedures. Previous attempts to enact general procedural legislation have been unsuccessful generally because they failed to recognize the significant and inherent differences between the tasks of courts and those of administrative agencies or because, in their zeal for simplicity and uniformity, they proposed too narrow and rigid a mold.

Nevertheless, the goal toward which these efforts have been directed is, in my opinion, worth while. Despite difficulties of draftsmanship, I believe that overall procedural legislation is possible and desirable. The administrative process is
now well developed. It has been subject in recent years to the most intensive and informed study—by various congressional committees, by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, by organizations such as the American Bar Association, and by many individual practitioners and legal scholars. We have in general—as we did not have until fairly recently—the materials and facts at hand. I think the time is ripe for some measure of control and prescription by legislation. I cannot agree that there is anything inherent in the subject of administrative procedure, however complex it may be, which defies workable codification.

Since the original introduction of S. 7, I understand that opportunity has been afforded to public and private interests to study its provisions and to suggest amendments. The agencies of the Government primarily concerned have been consulted and their views considered. In particular, I am happy to note that your committee and the House Committee on the Judiciary, in an effort to reconcile the views of the interested parties, have consulted officers of this Department and experts in administrative law made available by this Department.

The revised committee print issued October 5, 1945, seems to me to achieve a considerable degree of reconciliation between the views expressed by the various Government agencies and the views of the proponents of the legislation. The bill in its present form requires administrative agencies to publish or make available to the public an increased measure of information concerning their organization, functions, and procedures. It gives to that portion of the public which is to be affected by administrative regulations an opportunity to express its views before the regulations become effective. It prescribes, in instances in which existing statutes afford opportunity for hearing in connection with the formulation and issuance of administrative rules and orders, the procedures which shall govern such hearings. It provides for the selection of hearing officers on a basis designed to obtain highly qualified and impartial personnel and to insure their security of tenure. It also restates the law governing judicial review of administrative action.

The bill appears to offer a hopeful prospect of achieving reasonable uniformity and fairness in administrative procedures without at the same time interfering unduly with the efficient and economical operation of the Government. Insofar as possible, the bill recognizes the needs of individual agencies by appropriate exemption of certain of their functions.

After reviewing the committee print, therefore, I have concluded that this Department should recommend its enactment.

My conclusion as to the workability of the proposed legislation rests on my belief that the provisions of the bill can and should be construed reasonably and in a sense which will fairly balance the requirements and interests of private persons and governmental agencies. I think it may be advisable for me to attach to this report an appendix discussing the principal provisions of the bill. This may serve to clarify some of the essential issues and may assist the committee in evaluating the impact of the bill on public and private interests.

I am advised by the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget that while there would be no objection to the submission of this report, he questions the appropriateness of the inclusion of the words "independently of agency recommendations or ratings," appearing after the words "Examiners shall receive compensation prescribed by the [Civil Service] Commission," in section 11 of the bill, inasmuch as he deems it highly desirable that agency recommendations and ratings be fully considered by the Commission.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

TOM C. CLARK, Attorney General.
them" are intended to refer to the following, among others: National War Labor Board and the National Railroad Adjustment Board.

In section 2 (e) the phrase "the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances," etc., is not, of course, intended to be an exhaustive enumeration of the types of subject matter of rule making. Specification of these particular subjects is deemed desirable, however, because there is no unanimity of recognition that they are, in fact, rule making. The phrase "for the future" is designed to differentiate, for example, between the process of prescribing rates for the future and the process of determining the lawfulness of rates charged in the past. The latter, of course, is "adjudication" and not "rule making." (Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 284 U. S. 370.)

The definitions of "rule making" and "adjudication," set forth in subsections (c) and (d) of section 2, are especially significant. The basic scheme underlying this legislation is to classify all administrative proceedings into these two categories. The pattern is familiar to those who have examined the various proposals for administrative procedure legislation which have been introduced during the past few years; it appears also in the recommendations of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. Proceedings are classed as rule making under this act not merely because, like the legislative process, they result in regulations of general applicability but also because they involve subject matter demanding judgments based on technical knowledge and experience. As defined in subsection (c), for example, rule making includes not only the formulation of rules of general applicability but also the formulation of agency action whether of general or particular applicability, relating to the types of subject matter enumerated in subsection (c). In many instances of adjudication, on the other hand, the accusatory element is strong, and individual compliance or behavior is challenged; in such cases, special procedural safeguards should be provided to insure fair judgments on the facts as they may properly appear of record. The statute carefully differentiates between these two basically different classes of proceedings so as to avoid, on the one hand, too cumbersome a procedure and to require, on the other hand, an adequate procedure.

Section 3: This section applies to all agencies covered by the act, including war agencies and war functions. The exception of any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public interest is intended to cover (in addition to military, naval, and foreign affairs functions) the confidential operations of the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States attorneys, and other prosecuting agencies, as well as the confidential functions of any other agency.

Section 3 (a), by requiring publication of certain classes of information in the Federal Register, is not intended to repeal the Federal Register Act (44 U. S. C. 301 et seq.) but simply to require the publication of certain additional material. Section 3 (a) (4) is intended to include (in addition to substantive rules) only such statements of general policy or interpretations as the agency believes may be formulated with a sufficient degree of definiteness and completeness to warrant their publication for the guidance of the public.

Section 3 (b) is designed to make available all final opinions or orders in the adjudication of cases. Even here material may be held confidential if the agency finds good cause. This confidential material, however, should not be cited as a precedent. If it is desired to rely upon the citation of confidential material, the agency should first make available some abstract of the confidential material in such form as will show the principles relied upon without revealing the confidential facts.

Section 3 (c) is not intended to open up Government files for general inspection. What is intended is that the agencies, to the degree of specificity practicable, shall classify its material in terms of whether or not it is confidential in character and shall set forth in published rules the information or type of material which is confidential and that which is not.

Section 4. The term "naval" in the first exception clause is intended to include the defense functions of the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation.

Section 4 (b), in requiring the publication of a concise general statement of the basis and purpose of rules made without formal hearing, is not intended to require an elaborate analysis of rules or of the detailed considerations upon which they are based but is designed to enable the public to obtain a general idea of the purpose of, and a statement of the basic justification for, the rules. The requirement would also serve much the same function as the whereas clauses which are now customarily found in the preambles of Executive orders.
Section 4 (c): This subsection is not intended to hamper the agencies in cases in which there is good cause for putting a rule into effect immediately, or at some time earlier than 30 days. The section requires, however, that where an earlier effective date is desired the agency should make a finding of good cause therefor and publish its finding along with the rule.

Section 4 (d) simply permits any interested person to petition an agency for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. It requires the reception and consideration of petitions but does not compel an agency to undertake any rule-making procedure merely because a petition is filed.

Section 5: Subject to the six exceptions set forth at the commencement of the section, section 5 applies to administrative adjudications "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." It is thus limited to cases in which the Congress has specifically required a certain type of hearing. The section has no application to rule making, as defined in section 2 (c). The section applies, however, to licensing, with the exception that section 5 (e), relating to the separation of functions, does not apply in determining applications for initial licenses, i.e., original licenses as contradistinguished from renewals or amendments of existing licenses.

If a case fails within one of the six exceptions listed at the opening of section 5, no provision of section 5 has any application to that case; such a case would be governed by the requirements of other existing statutes.

The first exception is intended to exempt, among other matters, certain types of reparation orders assessing damages, such as are issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Secretary of Agriculture, since such orders are admissible only as prima facie evidence in court upon attempted enforcement proceedings or (at least in the case of reparation orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act) on the appeal of the losing party. Reparation orders involving in part an administrative determination of the reasonableness of rates in the past so far as they are not subject to trial de novo would be subject to the provisions of section 5 generally, but they have been specifically exempted from the segregation provisions of section 5 (e).

In the fourth exception, the term "naval" is intended to include adjudicative defense functions of the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, where such functions pertain to national defense.

Section 5 (a) is intended to state minimum requirements for the giving of notice to persons who under existing law are entitled to notice of an agency hearing in a statutory adjudication. While in most types of proceedings all of the information required to be given in clauses (1), (2), and (3) may be included in the "notice of hearing" or other moving paper, in many instances the agency or other moving party may not be in position to set forth all of such information in the moving paper, or perhaps not even in advance of the hearing, especially the "matters of fact and law asserted." The first sentence of this subsection merely requires that the information specified should be given as soon as it can be set forth and, in any event, in a sufficiently timely manner as to afford those entitled to the information an adequate opportunity to meet it. The second sentence complements the first and requires agencies and other parties promptly to reply to moving papers of private persons or permits agencies to require responsive pleading in any proceedings.

Section 5 (c) applies only to the class of adjudicatory proceedings included within the scope of section 5, i.e., cases of adjudication required by statute to be determined after opportunity for an agency hearing, and then not falling within one of the six excepted situations listed at the opening of section 5. As explained in the comments with respect to section 5 generally, this subsection does not apply either in proceedings to determine applications for initial licenses or in those to determine the reasonableness of rates in the past.

In the cases to which this subsection is applicable, if the informal procedures described in section 5 (b) (1) are not appropriate or have failed, a hearing is to be held as provided in sections 7 and 8. At such hearing the same officers who preside at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 7 shall make the recommended decision or initial decision "required by section 8" except where such officers become unavailable to the agency. The reference to section 8 is significant.

Section 8 (a) provides that, in cases in which the agency has not presided at the reception of the evidence, the officer who presided (or, in cases not subject to subsection (c) of section 5, an officer or officers qualified to preside at hearings pursuant to section 7) shall make the initial or recommended decision, as the case may be. It is plain, therefore, that in cases subject to section 5 (c), only the officer who presided at the hearing (unless he is unavailable for reasons beyond
the agency's control) is eligible to make the initial or recommended decision, as the case may be.

This subsection further provides that in the adjudicatory hearings covered by it no presiding officer shall consult any person or party on any fact in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate (except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law). The term "fact in issue" is used in its technical, litigious sense.

In most of the agencies which conduct adjudicative proceedings of the types subject to this subsection, the examiners are placed in organizational units apart from those to which the investigative or prosecuting personnel are assigned. Under this subsection such an arrangement will become operative in all such agencies. Further, in the adjudicatory cases covered by section 5 (c), no officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency in any case shall, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision. The term "fact in issue" is used in its technical, litigious sense.

In most of the agencies which conduct adjudicative proceedings of the types subject to this subsection, the examiners are placed in organizational units apart from those to which the investigative or prosecuting personnel are assigned. Under this subsection such an arrangement will become operative in all such agencies. Further, in the adjudicatory cases covered by section 5 (c), no officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency in any case shall, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision. However, this subsection does not apply to the agency itself or, in the case of a multi-headed agency, any member thereof. It would not preclude, for example, a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission personally conducting or supervising an investigation and subsequently participating in the determination of the agency action arising out of such investigation.

Section 5 (e), applying as it does only to cases of adjudication (except determining applications for initial licenses or determining reasonableness of rates in the past) within the scope of section 5 generally, has no application whatever to rule making as defined in section 2 (e). As explained in the comment on section 2 (e), rule making includes a wide variety of subject matters, and within the scope of those matters it is not limited to the formulation of rules of general applicability but includes also the formulation of agency action whether of general or particular application, for example, the reorganization of a particular company.

Section 5 (d): Within the scope of section 5 (i.e., in cases of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, subject to certain exceptions) the agency is authorized to issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty. Where declaratory orders are found inappropriate to the subject matter, no agency is required to issue them.

Section 6: Subsection (a), in stating a right of appearance for the purpose of settling or informally determining the matter in controversy, would not obtain if the agency properly determines that the responsible conduct of public business does not permit. It may be necessary, for example, to set the matter down for public hearing without preliminary discussion because a statute or the subject matter or the special circumstances so require.

It is not intended by this provision to require the agency to give notice to all interested persons, unless such notice is otherwise required by law.

This subsection does not deal with, or in any way qualify, the present power of an agency to regulate practice at its bar. It expressly provides moreover, that nothing in the act shall be construed either to grant or to deny the right of non-lawyers to appear before agencies in a representative capacity. Control over this matter remains in the respective agencies.

Section 6 (b): The first sentence states existing law. The second sentence is new.

Section 6 (c): The first sentence entitles a party to a subpoena upon a statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought. The second sentence is intended to state the existing law with respect to the judicial enforcement of subpoenas.

Section 6 (d): The statement of grounds required herein will be very simple, as contrasted with the more elaborate findings which are customarily issued to support an order.

Section 7: This section applies in those cases of statutory hearing which are required by sections 4 and 5 to be conducted pursuant to section 7. Subject to the numerous exceptions contained in sections 4 and 5, they are cases in which an order or rule is to be made upon the basis of the record in a statutory hearing.

Section 7 (a): The subsection is not intended to disturb presently existing statutory provisions which explicitly provide for certain types of hearing officers. Among such are (1) joint hearings before officers of the Federal agencies and persons designated by one or more States, (2) where officers of more than one agency sit, (3) quota allotment cases under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, (4) marine casualty investigation boards, (5) registers of the General Land Office,
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(6) special boards set up to review the rights of disconnected servicemen (38 U. S. C. 693h) and the rights of veterans to special unemployment compensation (38 U. S. C. 696h), and (7) boards of employees authorized under the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U. S. C. 17 (2)).

Subject to this qualification, section 7 (a) requires that there shall preside at the taking of evidence one or more examiners appointed as provided in this act, unless the agency itself or one or more of its members presides. This provision is one of the most important provisions in the act. In many agencies of the Government this provision may mean the appointment of a substantial number of hearing officers having no other duties. The resulting expense to the Government may be increased, particularly in agencies where hearings are now conducted by employees of a subordinate status or by employees having duties in addition to presiding at hearings. On the other hand, it is contemplated that the Civil Service Commission, which is empowered under the provisions of section 11 to prescribe salaries for hearing officers, will establish various salary grades in accordance with the nature and importance of the duties performed and will assign those in the lower grades to duties now performed by employees in the lower brackets. It may also be possible for the agencies to reorganize their staffs so as to permit the appointment of full-time hearing officers by reducing the number of employees engaged on other duties.

This subsection further provides for withdrawal or removal of examiners disqualified in a particular proceeding. Some of the agencies have voiced concern that this provision would permit undue delay in the conduct of their proceedings because of unnecessary hearings or other procedure to determine whether affidavits of bias are well founded. The provision does not require hearings in every instance but simply requires such procedure, formal or otherwise, as would be necessary to establish the merits of the allegations of bias. If it is manifest that the charge is groundless, there may be prompt disposition of the matter. On the other hand, if the affidavit appears to have substance, it should be inquired into. In any event, whatever procedure the agency deems appropriate must be made a part of the record in the proceeding in which the affidavit is filed.

Section 7 (b): The agency may delegate to a hearing officer any of the enumerated powers with which it is vested. The enumeration of the powers of hearing officers is not intended to be exclusive.

Section 7 (c): The first sentence states the customary rule that the proponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof. Statutory exceptions to the rule are preserved. Parties shall have the right to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. This is not intended to disturb the existing practice of submitting technical written reports, summaries, and analyses of material gathered in field surveys, and other devices appropriately adapted to the particular issues involved in specialized proceedings. Whether the agency must in such cases produce the maker of the report depends, as it does under the present law, on what is reasonable in all the circumstances.

It may be noted that agencies are empowered, in this subsection, to dispense with oral evidence only in the types of proceedings enumerated; i. e., in instances in which normally it is not necessary to see and hear the witnesses in order properly to appraise the evidence. While there may be types of proceedings other than those enumerated in which the oral testimony of the witnesses is not essential, in such instances the parties generally consent to submission of the evidence in written form so that the inability of the agency to compel submission of written evidence would not be burdensome.

The provision regarding "evidence in written form" does not limit the generality of the prevailing principle that "any evidence may be received"; i. e., that the rules of evidence as such are not applicable in administrative proceedings and that all types of pertinent evidentiary material may be considered. It is assumed, of course, that agencies will, in the words of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, rely only on such evidence (whether written or oral) as is "relevant, reliable, and probative." This is meant as a guide, but the courts in reviewing an order are governed by the provisions of section 10 (e), which states the "substantial evidence" rule.

Section 7 (d): The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, shall constitute the exclusive record for decision, in the cases covered by section 7. This follows from the proposition that sections 7 and 8 deal only with cases where by statute the decision is to be based on the record of hearing. Further, section 7 is limited by the exceptions contained in the opening sentences of sections 4 and 5; accordingly, certain special classes of cases, such as those where decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or
elections, are not covered. The second sentence of the subsection enables the agency to take official notice of material facts which do not appear in the record, provided the taking of such notice is stated in the record or decision, but in such cases any party affected shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show the contrary.

Section 8: This section applies to all hearings held under section 7.

Section 8 (a): Under this subsection either the agency or a subordinate hearing officer may make the initial decision. As previously observed with respect to subsection (c) of section 5, in cases to which that subsection is applicable the same officer who personally presided over the hearing shall make such decision if it is to be made by a subordinate hearing officer. The agency may provide that in all cases the agency itself is to make the initial decision, or after the hearing it may remove a particular case from a subordinate hearing officer and thereupon make the initial decision. The initial decision of the hearing officer, in the absence of appeal to or review by the agency, is (or becomes) the decision of the agency. Upon review the agency may restrict its decision to questions of law, or to the question of whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence or the weight of evidence, as the nature of the case may be. On the other hand, it may make entirely new findings either upon the record or upon new evidence which it takes. It may remand the matter to the hearing officer for any appropriate further proceedings.

The intention underlying the last sentence of this subsection is to require the adoption of a procedure which will give the parties an opportunity to make their contentions to the agency before the issuance of a final agency decision. This sentence states as a general requirement that whenever the agency makes the initial decision without having presided at the reception of the evidence, a recommended decision shall be filed by the officer who presided at the hearing (or, in cases not subject to section 5 (c), by any other officer qualified to preside at section 7 hearings). However, this procedure need not be followed in rule making or in determining applications for initial licenses (1) if, in lieu of a recommended decision by such hearing officer, the agency issues a tentative decision; (2) if, in lieu of a recommended decision by such hearing officer, a recommended decision is submitted by any of the agency's responsible officers; or (3) if, in any event, the agency makes a record finding that "due and timely execution of its function imperatively and unavoidably so requires."

Subsection (c) of section 5, as explained in the comments on that subsection, does not apply to rule making. The broad scope of rule making is explained in the notes to subsection (c) of section 2.

The second exception permits, in proceedings to make rules and to determine applications for initial licenses, the continuation of the widespread agency practice of serving upon the parties, as a substitute for either an examiner's report or a tentative agency report, a report prepared by the staff of specialists and technicians normally engaged in that portion of the agency's operations to which the proceeding in question relates. The third exception permits, in lieu of any sort of preliminary report, the agency to issue forthwith its final rule or its order granting or denying an initial license in the emergent instances indicated. The subsection, however, requires that an examiner issue either an initial or a recommended decision, as the case may be, in all cases subject to section 7 except rule making and determining applications for initial licenses. The act permits no deviation from this requirement, unless, of course, the parties waive such procedure.

Section 8 (b): Prior to each recommended, initial, or tentative decision, parties shall have a timely opportunity to submit proposed findings and conclusions, and, prior to each decision upon agency review of either the decision of subordinate officers or of the agency's tentative decision, to submit exceptions to the initial, recommended, or tentative decision, as the case may be. Subject to the agency's rules, either the proposed findings or the exceptions may be oral in form where such mode of presentation is adequate.

Section 9: Subsection (a) is intended to declare the existing law. Subsection (b) is intended to codify the best existing law and practice. The second sentence of subsection (b) is not intended to apply to temporary licenses which may be issued pending the determination of applications for licenses.

Section 10: This section, in general, declares the existing law concerning judicial review. It provides for judicial review except insofar as statutes preclude it, or insofar as agency action is by law committed to agency discretion. A statute
may in terms preclude judicial review or be interpreted as manifesting a congres-
sional intention to preclude judicial review. Examples of such interpretation are: Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation Board (320 U. S. 297); American Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board (308 U. S. 401); Butte, Anaconda and Pacific Railway Co. v. United States (290 U. S. 127). Many matters are committed partly or wholly to agency discretion. Thus the courts have held that the refusal by the National Labor Relations Board to issue a complaint is an exercise of discretion unreviewable by the courts (Jacbozen v. National Labor Relations Board, 120 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 3d); Marine Engineers' Beneficial Assn. v. National Labor Relations Board, decided April 8, 1943 (C. C. A. 2d), certiorari denied, 320 U. S. 777). In this act, for example, the failure to grant a petition filed under section 4 (d) would be similarly unreviewable.

Section 10 (a): Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review of such action. This reflects existing law. In Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes (302 U. S. 464), the Supreme Court stated the rule concerning persons entitled to judicial review. Other cases having an important bearing on this subject are: Massachusetts v. Mellon (262 U. S. 447), The Chicago Junction Case (264 U. S. 258), Sprunt & Son v. United States (281 U. S. 249), and Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. (310 U. S. 113). An important decision interpreting the meaning of the terms “aggrieved” and “adversely affected” is Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station (309 U. S. 470).

Section 10 (b): This subsection requires that where a specific statutory method is provided for reviewing a given type of case in the courts, that procedure shall be used. If there is no such procedure, or if the procedure is inadequate (i. e., where under existing law a court would regard the special statutory procedure as inadequate and would grant another form of relief), then any applicable procedure, such as prohibitory or mandatory injunction, declaratory judgment, or habeas corpus, is available. The final sentence of the subsection indicates that the question of the validity of an agency action may arise in a court proceeding to enforce the agency action. The statutes presently provide various procedures for judicial enforcement of agency action, and nothing in this act is intended to disturb those procedures. In such a proceeding the defendant may contest the validity of the agency action unless a prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity to contest or review validity has been provided by law.

Section 10 (c): This subsection states (subject to the provisions of section 10 (a)) the acts which are reviewable under section 10. It is intended to state existing law. The last sentence makes it clear that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to finality of agency action is intended to be applicable only (1) where expressly required by statute (as, for example, is provided in 49 U. S. C. 17 (9)), or (2) where the agency's rules require that decisions by subordinate officers must be appealed to superior agency authority before the decision may be final for purposes of judicial review.

Section 10 (d): The first sentence states existing law. The second sentence may be said to change existing law only to the extent that the language of the opinion in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (316 U. S. 4, 14) may be interpreted to deny to reviewing courts the power to permit an applicant for a renewal of a license to continue to operate as if the original license had not expired, pending conclusion of the judicial review proceedings. In any event, the court must find, of course, that granting of interim relief is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.

Section 10 (e): This declares the existing law concerning the scope of judicial review. The power of the court to direct or compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed is not intended to confer any nonjudicial functions or to narrow the principle of continuous administrative control enunciated by the Supreme Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Potomac Broadcasting Co. (309 U. S. 134). Clause (5) is intended to encompass the law as stated, for example, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (305 U. S. 197). There the Chief Justice said: "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (p. 229) * * * assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force" (p. 230).

The last sentence of this section makes it clear that not every failure to observe the requirements of this statute or of the law is ipso facto fatal to the validity of
an order. The statute adopts the rule now well established as a matter of common law in all jurisdictions that error is not fatal unless prejudicial.

Section 11: This section provides for the appointment, compensation, and tenure of examiners who will preside over hearings and render decisions pursuant to sections 7 and 8. The section provides that appointments shall be made "subject to the civil service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent with this act." Appointments are to be made by the respective employing agencies of personnel determined by the Civil Service Commission to be qualified and competent examiners. The examiners appointed are to serve only as examiners, except that, in particular instances (especially where the volume of hearings under a given statute or in a given agency is not very great), examiners may be assigned additional duties which are not inconsistent with or which do not interfere with their duties as examiners. To insure equality of participation among examiners in the hearing and decision of cases, the agencies are required to use them in rotation so far as may be practicable.

Examiners are subject to removal only for good cause "established and determined" by the Commission. The Commission must afford the examiner a hearing, if requested, and must rest its decision solely upon the basis of the record of such hearing. It should be noted that the hearing and the decision are to be conducted and made pursuant to the provisions of sections 7 and 8.

Section 11 provides further that the Commission shall prescribe the compensation of examiners, in accordance with the compensation schedules provided in the Classification Act, except that the efficiency rating system set forth in that act shall not be applicable to examiners.

Section 12: The first sentence of section 12 is intended simply to indicate that the act will be interpreted as supplementing constitutional and legal requirements imposed by existing law.

The section further provides that "no subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly." It is recognized that no congressional legislation can bind subsequent sessions of the Congress. The present act can be repealed in whole or in part at any time after its passage. However, the act is intended to express general standards of wide applicability. It is believed that the courts should as a rule of construction interpret the act as applicable on a broad basis, unless some subsequent act clearly provides to the contrary.